Also good catch on the fallacy of composition – i.e. that either Basra (or Anbar) are necessarily proxies for the rest of Iraq.

That is a question that should be asked of our president and vice president their every working day. It’s a question that should haunt their nights.

Because, their running out the clock to avoid presiding over something less than a victory is costing people their lives.

Remember, I said should.

Because Basra is seen as an important indicator of what would happen in the event of a broader troop withdrawal

Seen by whom? Iraq is way too complex to extrapolate what happens in Basra to the rest of the country, just as the success in Anbar, Diyala and elsewhere cannot be carbon-copy replicated everywhere. What the British have done is Basra is very similar to what the US did in Anbar in 2005-2006, for example, under Casey’s “disengagement” plan. That, obviously, didn’t work out so well.

So you’re right on the money with this post.

On top of that,come the Iranian and Syrian influence, the influx of insurgents from Saudi Arabia and the still presesnt Al Qaeda, all of it covered by a web of corruption at all levels.
What underlies the stay/go arguments hasn’t moved much off first base if you consider Iraq as a whole. It’s a different story in different regions in nn ever changing kaleidoscope. There is no teason to think that will change any time soon, IMO.

For the American public, then, it becomes a question of how long and to what extent the US could/ chould play the role of referee/.police.
It’s amazing and deeply regrettable, that no politician and no candidate lays out the picture in these realistic terms. It’s all showman talk and bravado.

Biden is the exception, but his plan for separation does not go over well with the Iraqis. They seem to be one of two types: either they are clinging to the idea of turning beack the clock and rresurrecting integrated neighborhoods or thery are involved in the power struggle.

I’m doubtful that statements by senators like Levin, recommending the ouster of al Malik or other drastic internal change are helpfuli The last thing the Iraqis want to hear is the US talking like an imperial power, willing to rearrange the Iraqi chess board at will. No matter how badly thigns are going, any people would feel insulted by being ignored as the big boys play in their country.
That is what the US doesn’t seem to get.

In a narrow way, Basra is the canary in the mine, though.

Back to Basra, “IntheRedzone” by Steven Vincent is a good starting point at a nuanced look at Basra. And the IRONY of his murder by Shia militia says it all. The militia angle went unreported in the US, didn’t fit the AQ narrative.

Good piece, and you are correct that simplistic portrayals don’t cut it.

One very important factor is that the British Army has ceded Basra city to the militias and conditions should be viewed through that prism. When they are, “success” and “failure” become a whole lot less relative.