We leave. We let the bloodbath happen, and then we deal with whoever takes over Iraq and actually represents Iraq instead of the charade of a gov’t there now. Whoever that is will NOT be friendly to our interests.

This will be a huge moral burden to bear, and will rightfully be a shame on our nation for at least a generation. It was deteremined back in 2003, when we attacked a nation for no reason, removed its gov’t, police, and infrastructure, then imagined that an un-asked for democracy would bloom in the desert. Every death will be on our hands and should be remembered as a lesson in what happens when authority is handed to the unwise and unaccountable.

It can happen today, or it can happen 10 years from now when die hard conservatives face reality.

When all policy decisions are filtered through a president who (quite possibly) willfully deceived a nation to begin a war (for reasons about which we love to speculate but may not yet be able to establish), I have to imagine that that information bears repeating.

It bears repeating for the umpteen thousandth time? It bears repeating to the point that discussions of what policies we should pursue are drowned out? Do you seriously believe Bush’s mistakes will be “quietly backgrounded” if his enemies stop yelling about them?

Look, Bush has about 15 months left in office. Let’s assume that he will not change policy during that time. When should we start serious discussion of what to do in Iraq, what our strategic interests are and what policies would best serve those interests and those of our allies – NOW or January 2009? Since the election is well underway I would like to have the debate now so we can at least examine the various candidates’ proposed policies before stepping into the voting booth. And I asked you before: Explain to me exactly how repetition of Bush’s mistakes/crimes/lies – informs our policy options and strategic interests in the changed ME environment we’re now in? How does yet another treatise on the lack of WMD in Iraq tell us what our future role should be in the ME?

Looked at this way, I don’t think it will make one iota of difference if a drawdown of American forces commences at midnight tonight or at midnight on January 21, 2009 when George Bush leaves office, so why not much sooner than later?

I note that you use the term “drawdown” and not “withdrawal.” The difference is important. A drawdown will happen beginning early next year no matter what. It will, I’m sure, be played by the administration as voluntary associated with the “success” of the surge, but the reality is that the surge in troops (different from the change in “surge” strategy) was a temporary measure from the beginning since keeping 160k is not sustainable past a single deployment cycle. By next summer the force levels will have to fall to 130k, perhaps much lower.

Which begs the question: What difference will it make if another 1,000 American lives and another 20,000 Iraqi lives are shed in the service of plucking defeat from the jaws of disaster?

That’s a good question and a subjective judgment to be sure. To my mind, it reinforces my belief in the need for a cogent and reasoned analysis of our interests and policy options. ISTM we can’t make a decent judgment on that question unless we have some idea of the relative costs and benefits for various scenarios. Unfortunately, such debate is stifled by the “surrender monkey,” “victory” and “GTFOOIN (get the f’ out of Iraq now)” screaming that passes for “debate” these days.

Yes, I’m cynical.

Heaven forbid that I jinx it, but the civility of this thread is really heartening. A lot of well reasoned arguments for all sides of the issue.

My reverie was brought up short by an email I just got from a friend who is waiting to board an Air Force transport plane in Kuwait for his umpteenth embed in Iraq.

I fear for his safety, as I fear for the safety of my American and Iraqi brothers and sisters.

Which begs the question: What difference will it make if another 1,000 American lives and another 20,000 Iraqi lives are shed in the service of plucking defeat from the jaws of disaster?

Looked at this way, I don’t think it will make one iota of difference if a drawdown of American forces commences at midnight tonight or at midnight on January 21, 2009 when George Bush leaves office, so why not much sooner than later?

With due deference to the Give the Surge a Chance crowd, the conditions are simply not present — let alone the troops — for a short- or even middle-term outcome in Iraq that will leave them mollified. As I note in my post, there will not be a long-term outcome because that would be politically unpalatable at home.

So why not much sooner than later?

To be silent and allow such information to be quietly backgrounded while said president continues to lead policy decisions would seem unwise.

However, the point is moot. Most Americans want this war. They want the silence. They probably find the noise rude.

Hard or soft partition? The thought of this is mind boggling to me and in my opinion reflects a total failure of empathy.

How empathic is my solution compared to yours of total withdrawal? Where is the “empathy” in letting the Iraqi’s butcher themselves and create the hardest of hard partitions? Speaking of total withdrawal and empathy for the people of Iraq in the same breadth is mind-boggling.

And here’s a slightly edited version of your scenario Davebo:

“Look, we invaded and occupied your country and you guys are frankly not nearly appreciative enough for our tastes. So, we’re leaving now, good luck! You 700,000 Sunnis who have managed to survive this long in Baghdad should gather whatever belongings you can fit into two suitcases because the shia are waiting in the wings to kill you once we’re gone. ”

The past is absolutely relevant in the scope of moving forward. There is no reason to ignore any of it.

If we are to discuss “moving forward” with those who deceived us in the past, would it not be prudent to understand the deception thoroughly, to avoid future mistakes?

Of course, but what do you think has been going on for the past three years? The issue is not that focusing on the past is bad, the issue is that focusing on the past to exclusion of almost everything else is bad, and that’s what the “anti-war” opponents on the left have spent too much of their time doing. Explain to me exactly how repetition of Bush’s mistakes/crimes/lies – informs our policy options and strategic interests in the changed ME environment we’re now in? How does yet another treatise on the lack of WMD in Iraq tell us what our future role should be in the ME?

Do America’s strategic objectives over ride everything?

Pretty much yes. Nations rarely do something that is not in their strategic interest – at least not intentionally. Every nation prioritizes its own strategic interests above others. That isn’t a zero-sum-game, obviously, and the benefit of a particular strategic objective must be weighed not only by a particular US desire, but also by the real and potential negative consequences of an action.

And what are “Iraq’s” objectives anyway? Since no one, apparently, has the authority, either real or otherwise, to speak for the entire “nation” of Iraq, then how does one determine what “Iraq’s” interests are? You can’t – Iraq is really a country in name only at this point and what constitutes their collective interests is highly variable.

In your “drain the oilfields dry” scenario, assuming this is even possible (and I don’t believe it is), there would be negative consequences that would probably make it an undesirable course of action. Given the infrastructure and security requirements, it would likely be very expensive. The international outrage at such an action would be a significant cost. Even assuming the US wanted to drain Iraq of all it’s oil, the negative consequences of doing so are real and significant enough to make such an action contrary to US interests as a whole.

I would argue that one of our primary strategic interests is regional stability to ensure an unfettered flow of oil to the US and our allies (many of whom are much more dependent upon ME oil than we are). The invasion of Iraq, obviously, was completely contrary to that long-standing policy objective. So one important question should be – how do we best limit the instability we caused in Iraq?

WRT Iran, I see little future for an Iranian-Iraqi alliance since I see little future for the “nation” of Iraq. The US will have to accept some Iranian influence in parts of Iraq simply on historic grounds, but Iran will have no real ability to dominate the Sunni and Kurd areas even if they tried.

And Entropy, when you find yourself in a losing situation and notice that your a bleeding billions of dollars and thousands of lives for no real reason, withdrawel is a perfectly sane policy.

Hard or soft partition? The thought of this is mind boggling to me and in my opinion reflects a total failure of empathy.

“Look, we invaded and occupied your country and you guys are frankly not nearly appreciative enough for our tastes. So, I want the 700,000 Sunnis who have managed to survive this long in Baghdad to gather whatever belongings you can fit into two suitcases and get on these buses over here.”

This Entropy is why looking back is so critical. It was an unbelievable level of hubris that got us into this mess, but your preferred solution makes that hubris seem downright meek.

Entropy – Missing from your analysis is anything about Iraq’s objectives. Do America’s strategic objectives over ride everything? Where is the proper line between satisfying our objectives vs the other party. For example, one obvious objective that would help the US immensely is for us to take over Iraq’s oil fields and drain’em dry. I’m not advocating this but it is an example of something that benefits us but not Iraq.

One of our strategic objectives is to prevent Iraq from being allied with Iran. But what if it’s in Iraq’s best interest to do so? Who gets to make that decision and why?

Moving on, though, I agree with SD that the discussion should focus on what the future of our involvement in Iraq should be and and not the steps that got us into this mess. Knowing that we went into this war because of deception or whatever does little to formulate a policy going forward.

The past is absolutely relevant in the scope of moving forward. There is no reason to ignore any of it.

If we are to discuss “moving forward” with those who deceived us in the past, would it not be prudent to understand the deception thoroughly, to avoid future mistakes?

Moving on, though, I agree with SD that the discussion should focus on what the future of our involvement in Iraq should be and and not the steps that got us into this mess. Knowing that we went into this war because of deception or whatever does little to formulate a policy going forward.

But don’t expect David Petraeus or Ryan Crocker, let alone George Bush, to look forward when their primary motivation is to win time and score political points by looking back.

Well, we’ll see. What’s clear, though, is that the most vociferous proponents of withdrawal are doing exactly the above – scoring political points by looking back.

In any event, while I would agree with Shaun that the Bush administration’s stated goals in Iraq are unlikely to be achieved anytime soon, if at all, the question becomes, what should our goals be? The focus on timetables and withdrawal espoused by Shaun and others seem divorced from any coherent strategy or policy objective beyond withdrawal. In essence, withdrawal has become a policy objective in an of itself and has superseded all other interests the US may have in Iraq or the region. That’s why we don’t hear advocates of immediate withdrawal talk much about consequences, or what greater strategic American objectives withdrawal might service because it has become THE strategic objective in their minds. At least that’s my impression.

I would argue, on the other hand, that before determining a course of action in Iraq, we must first identify our interests and then identify policy options that have a reasonable chance of achieving those objectives. Withdrawal may be the best option in such an analysis, but I think the analysis needs to take place, and so far it hasn’t. Advocating a course of action (withdrawal) without examination of the policy implications is putting the cart before the horse. One might further argue that a similar lack of analysis played a role in starting the war in the first place – what I called faith-based planning. ISTM most advocates of withdrawal are making the same mistake.

I have advocated here before that a hard or soft partition of the country is the best option at this point – something we could husband with a much smaller force. Many of the Democratic candidates and the “timetable” bill/amendment put forth in Congress would keep forces in Iraq for different reasons. Given their rhetoric against Bush one would think they would be gung-ho on complete withdrawal, but they wisely, I believe, take a more nuanced view and realize that despite the failings of the past, there are still interests in Iraq that require military force to defend.

In short I think absolutist and politically motivated policy options do not serve the interests of the United States. In this regard the right’s focus on “winning” and the establishment of a western-style democracy are just as bad as withdrawal for withdrawal’s sake. Dare I say that the best option for the US, Iraq and the region might lie somewhere between those two extremes?

There will be no victory in Iraq as defined by Bush. It will not and cannot be a unified country that can stand on it’s own, at least not for many, many decades. It is a totally broken country that needs hundreds of billions in reconstruction, an amount that will take decades to achieve.

Furthermore, it will not help us in our fight against world wide terrorism. It will not tolerate AlQaeda when it’s one street over but the AlAnbar sunni tribes will not gives two hoots what AlQaeda does elsewhere, including the Shia areas of Iraq.

We have neither the money or staying power to fix Iraq. All we are doing now is fighting for honor and “face”. Iraq is slowly disolving into defacto three countries – Kurds, Sunni and Shia areas. Baghdad has already gone from a majority Sunni city to over 80% Shia. The only reason it’s not 100% Shia is we have walled in some neighborhoods. That will not last much longer. The rest of Iraq’s mixed areas are well on their way to sectarian purity.

We should meet with Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudia Arabia, Turkey, and Kuwait along with all the Iraqi constituencies and arrange for a peaceful end to this nightmare.
1 – The Shia areas of Iraq would fall under Iran’s area of influence. These areas would still be independent countries reflecting the arab and persian differences.
2 – Kurdistan becomes an independent country with the proviso that the PKK be disbanded and no territorial demands will be made on Iran, Turkey or Syria. Kurdish residents of those countries would be free to immigrate to Kurdistan.
3 – Kirkuk would revert to Kurdish control BUT the surrounding territory that contains oil would be divided between Kurdistan and “Sunnistan”.
4 – The Sunnis in Anbar and Diyala and portions of other provinces would become a country under the Saudia sphere of influence but with enough oil resources to sustain themselves.

All of this would be enshrined in a DETAILED binding UN declaration. We should then take $150 billion a year that we have been spending in Iraq and develop true oil alternatives – shale, tar sands, wind, hydro, coal synthetic oil, ethanol, solar etc. This would allow us to withdraw, for the most part, from the Mideast while the rest of the world wrestles with peak oil.

All of this I believe would allow us to slowy withdraw our troops from Iraq ober the next 18 months.

In the real world, the only thing that should concern a decision today is the costs, benefits, and possible outcomes of any decision made today. Wading through th e past and nitpicking others never created a solution or even a course of action for anyone.

All I do is ask anyone who want to criticize or anyone who wants to propose “get out this minute” or even anyone who says stay until we win” to perform the same COA analysis that almost everyone has criticized the Bush Administration for failing to do.

Is the get out know crowd willing to abandon the Kurds in the north? What is the plan for refugees? What should be U.S. do about Jordon, Syria, and Iran (all Barack Obama proposes to do it meet with them)? Does anyone really expect the U.S. to keep an embassy in Baghdad (like Bill Richardson’s stump speech refers to)? What does the U.S. do about forces in Kuwait and Qatar? What is the Kuwaitis throw U.S. out? What is the Qataris throw the U.S. out? Can Iraq solve anything without help from the West?

Unlike so many people, I am unable to willfully forget the past — everything that has transpired from Colin Powell’s speech to the UN through to the Marines who were blown to Kingdom Come in Anbar earlier today — in projecting into the future.

That is why the progress reports are a charade. They will delineate every jot and tittle that can be defined as progress while avoiding the elephant in the room.

When one takes the elephant into account, then definitions like “failure” and “success” and “progress” take on very different meanings.

Regretably, and I know that you and many others are unable to come to terms with this reality, there can be nothing but “failure” in Iraq by both military and, most importantly, by political and social yardsticks. “Success” is an illusion and “progress” is in the eyes of the beholder.

This leaves open only the “degree” of “failure” and I am unable to opine on that because a key element is missing: An exit strategy and withdrawal timetable.

I’ll be sure to mention that to Hillary when we have tea this afternoon.

So, as you learned in activist training, you propose something that cannot be called a failure. To abandon Iraq without concern for what happens next means that no matter what happens inside Iraq cannot be called a failure.

I would say that any planned that destroys the Kurds autonomy in the north would be a complete failure. I would also say that any plan that causes problems for either Kuwait or Turkey should be considered a failure.

If you are proposing a complete evacuation of Iraq please define success and failure as part of the discussion. The left have rightly ripped President Bush for inadequate planning. Please do not encourage Democrats to do the same thing.

There is a dearth of fresh ideas from both sides. Did you hear any during the GOP presidential debate this week?

The reason for this is elucidated in my #1 above. It does not get much clearer than that. The hole that the U.S. has dug itself in Iraq is so deep that the dirt that it is so feverishly shoveling can barely clear the top of the hole.

The bloodbath in Iraq will continue not commence whether the U.S. stays or goes.

What in all likelihood will happen is the tiny fig leaf of a symbolic withdrawal early next year of one of the 20 brigades now in country. Dems and GOPs alike will then be able to pat themselves on the back . . . while the killing of Americans and Iraqis continues apace with no real exit strategy.

Look at how the Democratic candidates for president talk about keeping the embassay open after the removal of U.S. military forces. Do they really think that any country will be able to maintain a diplomatic mission in Iraq with just a few ceremonial guards?

The best the Democratic candidates can hope for is for the U.S. to abandon Iraq and it becomes so dangerous that the western media will not go there and thus Iraq is removed as a issue to be discussed (See Somalia as the model).