I would say that Powell’s failings came earlier, when he tied his military career’s rise to that of the Bush clan. Military men know one thing- war and conquest. They are not trained in diplomacy nor realpolitik, much less backdoor politicking.

So, yes, Powell’s failings come from his putting politics ahead of the military, but that was long before his failed ‘Adlai’ moment at the UN.

“I am unaware that Powell shared his “moment” with anyone who mattered” - sm

Yeah. Powell is a really interesting case in this regard. He has backpedaled from the Iraq decision almost continuously since leaving office. His June 10 Meet The Press appearance is the closest he has come to disowning it completely. He is very critical of the decisions made throughout and since, although he is still rationalizing his UN appearance (I comment here – and that is my last blog self reference).

I never got around to posting about this quote specifically, but I found this exchange with Russert to be particularly telling:

MR. RUSSERT: But did you think at that time a pre-emptive war was the best course for the US, or did you think that Saddam was already boxed because of the sanctions?

GEN. POWELL: I would’ve preferred no war because I couldn’t see clearly the unintended consequences. But we tried to avoid that war with the UN sanctions and putting increasing diplomatic and international pressure on Saddam Hussein. But when I took it to the president and said, “This is a war we ought to see if we can avoid,” I also said and made it clear to him, “If, at the end of the day, it is a war that we cannot avoid, I’ll be with you all the way.” That’s, that’s part of being part of a team. And therefore I couldn’t have any other outcome, and I had no reservations about supporting the president in war.

This is the moment where Powell chose personal loyalty and “being part of the team”, over what he knew to be a wrong decision. This is where he forgot (like MacNamara) that his loyalty to the American people took precedence over his loyalty to the President. This is where Powell failed us.

I suspect that, to this day, he still does not understand the degree to which that very conversation with the President, may have been the tipping point that put us on this course.

I more or less concede the point, and it is a good one. I equivocate only because McNamara did not go public over his private communications with LBJ until nearly three decades later, while I am unaware that Powell shared his “moment” with anyone who mattered. The Rumsfeld memo you cite in your post is fascinating insofar as it is advice not taken.

“McNamara has never explained the circumstances of his catharsis, that point at which he realized his manifold failures as defense secretary and the immense suffering, death and deprivation that he and LBJ were responsible for.”- sm

Speaking as one who explored this very comparison repeatedly in posts in posts over the last year (most recently December with “Bartender – One more Rum & Mac for the road!”) I think you miss one important point.

The critical “McNamara moment” was in 1968 when he resigned/was fired as SECDEF, rather than his confessional decades later. The point is that he claims he knew in 1968 that Vietnam was lost, communicated that to President, but not to the American people. The unknown, is whether it would have hastened our dis- engagement in that war if in 1968 the architect of that war had come clean with the American people.

Rumsfeld’s position on the war is on the record in his leaked memo to the President from the time of his resignation (another point of eerie comparison to MacNamara – see above post). There is no similar expression of “the war is lost” that i can read.

I wonder whether the more apt comparison looking for a “Mac Moment” is Colin Powell. Powell understood that the Iraq adventure was being planned managed in direct contravention to his own “Colin Doctrine”, A doctrine he developed specifically to keep the Army from bieng embroiled in another Vietnam. Like MacNamara, if he had chosen to share his real views with the American people in 2002, it might have made a difference in our actions since then. At least he only waied years for his mea culpa, as opposed to MacNamara’s decades.

Tapdancing has many virtues.

If you listen to McNamara you can tell that two things bothered him the most about Vietnam. The fact that the North finally took all the country, in effect making the entire US action in Vietnam a failure, and the large amount of US soldiers who died for this failure.

Rumsfeld won’t have those issues to contemplate. Even though the Bush Administration’s objectives may not be obtained to Iraq. The officially stated goal of eliminating Hussein and the defeat of his army has been accomplished. And although the cost in dollars is 19% higher so far the cost in soldiers lives is 86% lower so far.

But Fog of War is a great film: http://www.cosmoetica.com/B178-DES122.htm