The Surge May Be Doomed
…unless there is a major shift in focus. Here’s why.
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This post expresses all the worries I’ve been trying to present via scattered comments.
I don’t think the Maliki government is capable of achieving anything like reconcilitation or a united front. IMO, the only hope is in brokered peace with international involvement along the lines of what is being envisioned in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This is not a problem the Iraqis can settle on their own; Their system of representation prevents it.
Yours is an excellent point of focus, Jeb……too bad you’re not a candidate for POTUS.
You would then have the wherewithall to focus America on extricating itself from Iraq while mitigating the chance we relapse into post-Vietnam malaise.
Why this important nuance is not taken up as a more pragmatic focus of the conversation, I don’t know.
X+Y=Z
X= military success of surge, creating more stable conditions in Iraqi cities/neighborhoods
Y= political reconciliation at the national level with creation of stable central, unified government
Z= overall success of US Iraq mission
I’m not sure why it’s not acceptable to look at one variable without an assumption being made that one is ignoring the others. Just because Pollack, O’Hanlon and others are commenting that X seems to be improving doesn’t mean that anyone is under any false illusions about Y and Z.
CStanley, X is the problem as well as Y. Which explains why both men have been backing away from their claims in the Op Ed.
Civilian deaths are not, as they claimed, down by a third since the beginning of the surge no matter where you choose to claim the surge began.
And this isn’t a claim from Daily Kos, it’s from the Iraqi goverenment.
David,
As I pointed out in a different thread the other day, I’ve seen conflicting numbers on the civilian casualties so I don’t know what to believe. What numbers are you using? (BTW, I think it was you who stated that the Brookings Index contradicted the Op-Ed and I’m not sure if you saw my response, that the conflict was not there in the updated report that they published after the trip to Iraq- the update was published the day after the Op-Ed)
And anyway, my previous comment still stands even if you don’t think X is improving. It is still valid to LOOK at X as a separate variable and evaluate how it is going. Even if the Maliki govt falls and we’re ultimately not able to change Y or achieve Z, if we can change X for the better then we’ll leave behind a slightly less volatile situation (see casualobserver’s comment- it’s time to start seriously addressing what the aftermath is going to be, no matter what you think about the chances of ‘success’).
CS-
If Y doesn’t happen, then Z can’t happen, and X becomes an end it itself- in perpetuity, and that would mean redefining our goals in Iraq to mean this one single goal.
CS -
“we’ll leave behind a slightly less volatile situation”
How can we ‘leave behind’ a situation that is dependent on our continuous presence? Iraqi police and even the army splinter along sectarian lines. Without a strong governemtn, they can’t take over for US troops.
CS, it is frustrating isn’t it?
Here we hand the anti-Iraq contingent a constructive roadmap to move things forward and they still insist on revisiting the original act of getting lost.
I suspect they will never allow the non-left a “surrender with dignity”, but rather it seems the desire to punish Bush (and any of the original 80%) is greater than to desire to move the troops out under a rationale that doesn’t besmerch the miltary’s efforts all these years at the same time.
LOL, yes, CO.
Doma: if I try to answer your question, please refrain from admonishing me for telling you things you already know, OK? Because I can’t think of how to answer it without stating parts of the strategy of the counterinsurgency operation, which you’ve already informed me you are very familiar with.
Leaving behind a slightly more stable situation means that it is possible that the COIN strategy will have separated the insurgents from the support of the civilian population. You are describing factors which we’re all well aware of, that indicate that the insurgents have been supported by the civilian population. This is what we are attempting to change with the COIN strategy. Will we succeed? I have no idea. Is it possible though? Yes, if we stay long enough to reach a tipping point. Will US domestic politics allow that? Sadly, probably not.
Sad for who? Military contractors?
Iraq isn’t a playground for our armed forces. It isn’t a laboratory for people drunk on “spreading democracy,” and it’s certainly not our national gas station. It’s a land full of actual people that want us to leave.
CS says in a SIMPLE model:
The other day the Wingnuts had an orgasm over the NYT op-ed. The response was – see even “Libruls” say the surge is working. But your “model” needs Z(overall success) to be positive to work. A negative Z means failure. Well Y isn’t 0, it’s a very large negative number. So, the effect of X(a small tactical success) is dwarfed by Y. If going in X+Y=Z, one knows that Y will never be positive and is a HUGE negative, the chances of Z is NULL. This is why the Demoncrats wanted bechmarks, and W and the Townhall apologists scoffed at this. X+Y=Z Y is always going to negate X, therefore Z cannot happen.
Chris,
“Playground for our armed forces”?!?!?!? Do you actually think before you write this stuff?
It’s better for us to pull out of Iraq now and let the Sunnis be slaughtered, rather than try to create a more secure situation first?
BTW, what’s your opinion on Darfur? Would it just be opportunism for military contractors there too if we were at some point to send troops? Or does the lack of oil mean that we’d be excused from the accusations of having ulterior motives?
Rudi,
X is still a variable that matters, regardless of whether Y and Z wind up being above the threshold that we’d define as success. X is a measure of the volatility that we leave behind. It’s not going to be pretty but there are varying degrees of horror and we can still have some mitigating effect on that.
CS,
The Sunnis are being slaughtered right now. Cat’s out of the bag on that one. Besides, the Sunnis want us out of Iraq just as much as the Shia. So why should we stay to prevent a massacre when:
A) the massacre is already underway and our military shows no signs of being able to stop it
B) they don’t want our help to begin with
As for Darfur, I’d ask the same question first. Do they want our help? Then I’d look to the UN for a resolution authorizing intervention. And if all that happens then we could help if we have the resources to spare.
Chris,
Does it escape your notice that people in closed societies tend not to speak out against their oppressors and “ask for help”? Or that anti-American propaganda has created complete distrust so that many people in the Middle East have a reaction to US intervention which isn’t always rational?
C Stanley,
What exactly would be irrational about opposing U.S. intervention? Let’s see… we’ve destroyed Nicaragua, Vietnam and Iraq. Our support for the brutal Shah helped bring about the “Islamic Republic” in Iran. We’ve given our unconditional support to a country that has invaded Lebanon, Egpyt and parts of Syria multiple times. We support authoritarians in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan… need I go on?
Rudi, yes, the Exec branch is going to continue to reject the benchmarks, but I’m not so sure there might not be 60 votes in Congress come late September. I’m sure we can all write Petraeus’ report in general terms already……improvements where troops have been focused, decrements where they’re not, political unification still sorely lacking.
I can count about 6 or 7 R-Sens ready to jump for something, as long as it is drafted by somebody like Biden and not Okinawa Jack. And tell Harry to save his one-liners until after the vote.
CS – You simplified this with a mathimatical model/equation, well I guess your not a math major. You take a linear equation and don’t include coefficients, your equation should be aX+bY=Z. The Right jumped on O’Hanlon’s rosy op-ed and said were winning. You then go and say X is good so lets not ignore the fact, but X is insignificant in a real world model aX+bY=Z when b dwarfs a. The equation then becomes bY=Z, and that isn’t a pretty picture of Iraq.
The Wingnuts fell in love with the NYT op-ed. Well the authors are backtracking on their own piece. Belgravia Dispatch has an excellent piece which deconstucts the op-ed.
http://www.belgraviadispatch.com/2007/08/post_93.html
CS – From a ealier O’Hanlon WSJ op-ed included at BG post:
This snippet also echos Patreus opinion when he testified at his confirmation hearings. The solution has to be POLITICAL.
So CS your equation for Iraq, per Patreus and O’Hanlon is then: 1X+4Y=Z, and without Y succeeding X doesn’t matter. Y is negative, less than zero, so X is insignificant and Z won’t happen(always negative). The BJ post affirms Jeb’s post in GREAT detail, go read and comment.
CO – The end is near, I agree 100% with your comment 17. Totten’s and O’Hanlon’s McClown market postings aside, if the Iraqis don’t reconcile, the surge is moot. May experts paint an even darker picture. The upcoming referendum/vote on Kurdish autonomy is coming up. If the Maliki Shia block screws over the Kurds the civil war then becomes three sided, not just a Shia Sunnis war. Sounds good?
Rudi,
I agree that the right wingers who jumped on the Op-Ed were way off base (of course, the NYT choice of headline didn’t help- it made it much easier to misconstrue the authors’ intent for those who were already inclined to do so).
I’m not putting on rose colored glasses, just saying that there’s nothing inherently wrong in noting that there might actually be some pinkish color in the landscape, and that if our military presence is increasing the pink color then we ought to at least note that, then decide if it is in our interest to continue.
CS – Our legislature isn’t any better, the Sunnis
Republicanswalked out. Maybe Tom Delay can go over there and fix the political problems.The problem is that many in this country who desire a victory, hear that militarily things are looking up, but don’t understand that we have little or no control over whether or not the Iraqis pass legislation that will enable them to reconcile. I’m not sure how many Americans understand the tribal nature of Iraq, which, after all, had her boundaries drawn by the British.
I understand trying to create a secure environment to give them a chance to come together- but with the Sunni walkout today- it appears to have flopped like previous surges have.
As far as the Sunnis getting slaughtered by the Mahdi Army, I doubt that Saudi Arabia (who already is allowing recruits to go to Iraq to help out) would allow it. Iraq is in a sea of Sunni countries- with the exception of Iran, of course. The more likely result is the neighbors interfering, with the chance of regional war breaking out and oil going sky-high. Isn’t that really why we can’t leave?
CS-
The goal of the surge now is to separate civilians from insurgents? What happened to giving the Iraqi governemtn breathing space to get their house in order?
Since goals and definitions keep changing ,I’m better off sticking to the initial point of departure: there can be no resolution in Iraq based only on the military, and political settlements are crucial.
I think Pete Abel in his port expressed best where we are on that score.
Civilian deaths went up by a third in July compared to June.
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/GRA163911.htm
The reason for this is the return of the Shi’ite militias in full strength. So much of the pro-surge media has focused on the Sunni rejection of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). While this is obviously a very welcome development – no matter how short term the alliance between US and Sunni forces proves to be – the overall level of violence between sectarian forces is just as high as ever. Why? Because AQI was never a major player in the civil war, just an attention grabber with outrageous attacks against Shi’ite civilians. Far more common were attacks by Sunni insurgents against Shi’ite policemen , militiamen or government officials, and corresponding attacks by Shi’ite militias and corrupt policemen against Sunnis of all stripes.
The Shi’ite militia have free reign to assault Sunni civilians what with the US focusing so much of its attention on AQI. The Maliki government was supposed to crack down on the Sadrists and other Shi’ite militias but that never happened. US-led attacks against Shi’ite militias are very limited, and usually reflect intra-Shi’ite rivalry described incorrectly in the media as “government forces against Shi’ite militia.” Most of these raids, when they involve “Iraqi units” at all are really Badr Corpsmen under the Iraqi Army flag fighting Sadrists, or some other combination of Shi’ite militia. At the end of the day, none of the Shi’ite militias are prevented from cleansing out Sunnis in mixed neighborhoods and terrorizing Sunnis in general.
The political breakdown merely reflects this grassroots war that rages as ever before. Don’t be fooled by the presence or absence of attention-grabbing large-scale market bombings. Most of the violence in Iraq occurs under the radar, and shows up in monthly statistics or foreign press accounts (read Juan Cole regularly for updates).
There’s no doubt the Maliki government is corrupt to the core. Added to this problem is that it was purposely designed to have a weak central government (by the Iraqi’s, not us), and you have a situation that makes real political progress about impossible. Even if the corruption were absent, it’s still unlikely the government could meet the unrealistic “benchmarks” we supposedly set for it.
I don’t believe that makes the surge useless, however. If violence levels can be reduced and the success of Anbar replicated, then that could provide momentum for a true change of mission just in time for elections or a new President.
Personally, I’m leaning toward a hard or soft partition and put the unnatural “nation” of Iraq into the historical dustbin along with Yugoslavia. But the momentum could also be used to provide room for a significant cut in troops, to perhaps half of what they are now, which is what most of the Presidential candidates are advocating.
Doma,
I guess I presumed too much about your knowledge of the COIN strategy. Despite your allegations that the goal posts keep shifting, they have from the beginning focused on winning over civilian support. This was identified as a key failure of the operations through 2006 and attempts are being made to change that (with soldiers in the forward bases among the communities, patrolling the neighborhoods and helping with local needs.You might find this article informative.
CS-
re the goals or the surge:
“they have from the beginning focused on winning over civilian support.”
Yes, IN ORDER TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT A CHANCE TO DO WHAT THEY NEED TO DO.
The civilian support was supposed to be for the Iraqi GOVERNMENT, not US troops, per se.
Dropping the performance of the Iraqi government
from the equation, neatly accomplishes one thing:: support for the surge morphs into backing a protracted occupation of Iraq. As long as we’re there, what does it matter what the governement does, right?
This is bait and switch.
I’m not biting.
Entropy,
“I don’t believe that makes the surge useless, however. If violence levels can be reduced and the success of Anbar replicated, then that could provide momentum for a true change of mission ”
I agree about the surge not being useless.
However, if there is no political counterpart, I think the effect will be the opposite of a change of mission. The Iraqi security forces can not take over from US troops and maintain any imporvements, if they are not loyal to the Iraqi government. Unless there is a political resolution, there is no government to which they can be loyal. Any success the surge has will be used (and already is) as an arguemtn for extending our occupation.
The surge would have done more good if it had been accompanied by an equally strong attempt to resolve the political stalemate. Obviously, the Iraqis can’t do it on their own. Bush’s phone calls to Maliki aren’t going to help, either. It takes much more.
Pete Abel said it in his post. This needs international intervention. Where are the attempts to shore up the ultimate goal of the surge on that score?