Iraq War: Plans Change, While the Assumptions Remain the Same
In a tacit admission that the political clock is outrunning the military clock in Iraq, the U.S. command has gone public with portions of an ambitious plan that assumes a major military presence well past the presidential election and into 2009.
While the plan, called the Joint Campaign Plan, is technically classified and does not specifically address troop levels or withdrawal schedules, the mere fact that it was shared with a New York Times reporter shows how concerned commanders, and presumably the White House, are that pubic and public support for the war has eroded severely. In the past, President Bush has refused to discuss the U.S.’s long-term involvement, saying that would be akin to signaling to the enemy its intentions.
According to the plan, which is an outgrowth of the surge strategy, the U.S.’s intentions center on finally making Baghdad secure on the theory that this would give Iraqi political leaders the room they need to work toward political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis. Those efforts have been substantially stillborn since the onset of the civil war 18 months ago, while only small pockets of the capital have seen a reduction is violence.
Writes Michael R. Gordon:
“The goals in the document appear ambitious, given the immensity of the challenge of dealing with die-hard Sunni insurgents, renegade Shiite militias, Iraqi leaders who have made only fitful progress toward political reconciliation, as well as Iranian and Syrian neighbors who have not hesitated to interfere in Iraq’s affairs. And the White House’s interim assessment of progress, issued n July 12, is mixed.
“But at a time when critics at home are defining patience in terms of weeks, the strategy may run into the expectations of many lawmakers for an early end to the American mission here.”
The plan has two phases:
* A “near-term” phase with the goal of achieving security in Baghdad and other areas no later than June 2008. It envisions a reconciliation at the local level and progress toward reconciliation at the national level.
* An “intermediate” phase with the goal of achieving improved nationwide security no later than June 2009.
Military officials are being careful not to guarantee success and told Gordon they recognized that they may need to revise the plan if assumptions were not met.
Good damned thing given the state of Iraq four-plus years after the invasion and the still insufficient number of troops to carry out any kind of strategy or plan. Given that reality, it is extremely difficult to imagine the same old assumptions — chief among them that new life can be breathed into the corpse of a government — playing out in the U.S.’s favor.
Colonel Peter Mansooor, executive officer to General David Petraeus, said that:
“The idea behind the surge was to bring stability and security to the Iraqi people, primarily in Baghdad because it is the political heart of the country, and by so doing give the Iraqis the time and space needed to come to grips with the tough issues they face and enable reconciliation to take place.
“If eventually the Iraqi government and the various sects and groups do not come to some sort of agreement on how to share power, on how to divide resources and on how to reconcile and stop the violence, then the assumption on which the surge strategy was based is invalid, and we would have to re-look the strategy.”
The previous plan, which promoted the concept of the Iraqis taking more responsibility for security by reducing American forces, was widely viewed as a failure because Iraqis were unprepared to carry out expanded duties. As a consequence, sectarian killings spiked. They have only been somewhat reduced since the surge began earlier this year.
More here.
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11 Responses to “Iraq War: Plans Change, While the Assumptions Remain the Same”
[...] Court Link to Article white house Plans Change, Assumptions the Same » Posted at The Moderate Voice [...]
Amongst the long list of assumptions that have proven in the past to be wrong there is one that has barely been addressed. Conversation centers on the capability of giving the government of Iraq the capacity to contol it’s own country, and little consideration is given to the question of if they have any interest in doing so.
The people want peace, they want to have electricity, to not feel that they might be saying goodbye for the last time every time their child goes to school. But the politicians do not neccesarily care about these things. Instability and even war serves some people just fine. For starters war helps to cover up the incapacity to put your house in order in terms of roads, healthcare, schools etc. since everything can be blamed on the war. A terrified populace will continue to vote for their tribal peers, frightened that if “the others” win, they will be next on the hit list. These powerful men don’t give a damn about “securing the peace”, war works just fine for most of them.
[...] Clark Link to Article george w bush Plans Change, Assumptions the Same » Posted at The Moderate [...]
Well, considering the vagarities of domestic politics on Iraq, it seems prudent for our military leaders to at least plan for the long term. Unlike the Administration, they are considering “what if’s” should underlying assumptions prove false or should circumstances change. This is all prudent in my view and I think it’s unwise and unfair to ascribe political motivation by military commanders based on this kind of planning.
The decision on the future of US involvement is ultimately political, not military. Military leaders will, and should, inform the political debate with their expertise, but they cannot assume the war will end in 2008, 2009 or whenever and must be prepared to continue on in Iraq.
This is just more moving the goalposts with no real sign that the Iraqis can move towards any kind of reconciliation. Sept of 07′ just became June of ’08, but a civil war may need to rage way beyond that. The Iraqi government still shows no signs of having the popular support that they need to govern, and the Iraqi army is even further behind in its readiness than it was a year ago.
Basically the idea of the surge was to turf this mess to the next administration- and preserve the idea that victory was still possible. Gen Hayden had advised the ISG in ’05 that there was almost no chance that the Iraqi government would be able to govern the country. What little progress has been reported towards meeting the benchmarks was mostly WH spin.
How has “we’ll stand down as they stand up”, Operation Together Forward and Operation Sinbad worked so far? Lyxn has it right, the Shia have power and don’t want to share.
Actually, those operations were part of the strategy under Casey – a strategy that everyone agrees failed miserably.
So has the Iraqi government in making progress towards meeting the benchmarks. Military success will not create an Iraq that can govern or defend itself. Or is that no longer the measure of success??
Entropy – How long before Bremer and Tenet hand a medal on Casey? Seems the Friedman’s and Kristol’s used to say give Casey a chance.
Rudi,
Casey is this war’s Westmoreland. He’s a terrible officer, so naturally he was promoted to CSA after doing such a good job in Iraq.
We finally have some good leadership running the war at the operational level, but it’s too little, too late.
I don’t see that it was Casey’s fault that Iraqiization didn’t work, any more than it is Petraeus’ fault that the Iraqi govt won’t reach political consensus.
The mistakes that were made early on to invade and then to occupy instead of turning the country over early on to the Iraqis are what cost us the war. We are over there stuck in a quagmire that is twice as bad as Vietnam. Not because of what Casey did but because Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz were out of their league when they planned this in the first place. Everyone says we should forget the past and concentrate on the present, but its hard to do when the past created the intransigent problems we are facing in the present.