To Be, or Not to Be . . . an Empire
A very interesting short contribution at the AEI website, written by Gary J. Schmitt. The title of the article: “To Be, or Not to Be . . . an Empire.” Read it in its entirety, here are the last three paragraphs:
As former Reagan and Clinton administration official Stephen Sestanovich has argued, it is historically inaccurate to see George W. Bush’s foreign policy as marking “a dramatic departure from that of his predecessors.” When one examines “the primary security problems” facing the preceding three presidents–Clinton (Kosovo and the Balkans), George H. W. Bush (the end of the Cold War and German reunification), and Reagan (the East-West confrontation and the deployment of intermediate missiles in Europe)–one discovers an underlying continuity in policy: rejecting compromise, rocking the boat of conventional thinking, and ignoring the worries of key allies. In short, “to look at how the Bush Administration’s immediate predecessors dealt with the most important international challenges of their time is to see the true maximalist tradition of our diplomacy. The current administration has put its own stamp on this tradition; it did not originate it.”[8]
This does not mean that criticism of how the Bush team has carried out its strategy or criticism of the strategy itself is unwarranted. Nor does it mean that a new presidency should necessarily follow in its predecessors’ footsteps. But traditions tend to exist for good reasons. They usually reflect a response to an underlying reality that is not easily overcome or ignored. As Robert Kagan notes in his groundbreaking history of America’s early foreign policy, that tradition springs not from one man or one party, but largely from the character of the regime itself as it confronts the world around it.[9] From day one, Americans have been pushing outward, and their statecraft has always rested uneasily with the world as they found it. As often as not, circumstances permitting, Washington has been in the business of trying to change the status quo of international affairs.
It is possible, of course, that in 2008 we may see the election of a president who will take the nation in a direction substantially different from that of his pred-ecessors. But if recent history is any guide–and if the world remains as it is–it will be difficult for a new president, regardless of his wishes, to lay aside the mantle of American leadership. Both George W. Bush and Bill Clinton entered office hoping to reduce America’s profile in the world, creating a more modest foreign policy; both will have left understanding just how difficult–if not impossible–a task that is.
Interesting food for thought.
6 Responses to “To Be, or Not to Be . . . an Empire”
I posted in a similar vein this week, Michael.
Oh, please.
Wouldn’t that depend on which conflict you’re speaking of? There is nothing that parallels the way that this administration handled Iraq that compares with what any of those presidents did. Afghanistan, yes. Iraq, no. Especially when it comes to refusal to compromise and ignoring and alienating our allies, this administration takes the cake.
I agree with Jim S- the premise of this argument is faulty. Venerable statesmen from past administrations have all vehemently objected to the Bush/Cheney foreign policy because of its arrogance and reliance on force over diplomacy, including Jim Baker, Henry Kissenger, Brent Scowcroft,Madeline Albright, Jimmy Carter, and Zbigenew Brezinski, Colin Powell.
To try to make the case that this is just a continuation of what has gone before is fallacious. It is a complete break from what has gone before, which is why it has been so radical and so disasterous.
I think the exaggeration of how much the present administration differs from broader patterns of American foreign policy is putting us in danger of continuing mistakes after this administration ends. Those who have placed exclusive or exaggerated blame on “the Bushies” and “the neocons” will be prone not to see elements of those patterns that continue under a Democratic administration in 2008. Because Bush is gone, they will believe the problem is gone. And they will be wrong.
I see this as a serious error. Not only is BDS annoying in that it hijacks and coarsens conversations, but it also makes it adherents prone to miss the larger picture, that there are imperalist trends in U.S. foreign policy that go back much further than 2001 and that those trends tend to persist regardless of party or president. A fundamental reexamination of U.S. foreign policy requires looking beyond the partisan passions of the moment and seeing the whole board.
I guess I’ll be coarsening the discussion some more, because I also think this war can not be compared to the others cited.
Invading Arab lands in the middle of the ME hornet’s nest, is an issue onto itself. The only one that compares is Afghanistan, and there, at least we went in with international support and a clear purpose (terrorist camps and Bin Laden in the mountains) connected to the US.
Iraq is entirely different in that sense. Regardless of the purpose, stirring up the across-the region ME passions and hatreds was a predicably doomed project, no matter how efficient the management of the war had been. We will have one awful time getting out for the same reason. No matter what strategies we employ, we will always be the unwelcome invaders and occupiers, caught in Bin Laden’s trap.
Doing it better may have helped, but it’s only a question of degrees, The big pidure would be the same.
I forgot to mention, that this is also the first war that led tthe word ‘torture’ to be officially associated with the US.
This war is not just another war. No way. This President stands like a sore thumb in the annals of warfaring presidents.