First of course, there’s the problem that these assumptions are made by the same people who said our entry into Iraq would be “a cakewalk” and “greeted as liberators”.

Critiques of an argument based solely on the alleged source are logically flawed. Also, arguments about a post-withdrawal are being made by people other than the “they will greet us as liberators” set.

Most relevant to this post, the author Robert Dreyfuss points out that neither side has much in the way of heavy weapons or armor, and hence can’t take a sectarian war deep into the other’s territory.

As the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences showed, heavy weaponry is not necessary for ethnic cleansing, mass murder, and other atrocities. In Rwanda, the majority of the genocide was done with machetes.

For my part, I tend to think that this question of disloyalty in the Iraqi security forces will be a problem that is diminished over time. As US troops withdraw, and Iraqis are forced to deal with the current security situation themselves, I think that there will be much less tolerance for sectarianism and violence.

Actually, a major problem with the Iraqi security forces is that they are loyal. Just not to the nation of Iraq. Some of the recent mosque bombings are believed to have been carried out, or aided by the very guards who were supposed to protect them.

Others are loyal to their tribe (like the Kurdish units) or their specific chain of command. This is why it’s so hard for the American strategy to succeed. They have no real group in Iraq to support. They’re all loyal to one or another of the fighting factions – and they want the Americans to help finish off their rivals.

Most relevant to this post, the author Robert Dreyfuss points out that neither side has much in the way of heavy weapons or armor, and hence can’t take a sectarian war deep into the other’s territory. Dreyfuss warns that about the only thing that could change this dynamic is if the United States gives the Iraqi army the heavy weapons to escalate this battle. Your post underscores the need for caution in further feeding the civil war.

For my part, I tend to think that this question of disloyalty in the Iraqi security forces will be a problem that is diminished over time. As US troops withdraw, and Iraqis are forced to deal with the current security situation themselves, I think that there will be much less tolerance for sectarianism and violence.

Unfortunately, experience in Bosnia shows that this optimistic view of reduced sectarian violence in a post-withdrawal Iraq is not likely.