Here’s a follow up report from NBC.

Despite our deepest desires, there is no way to end the IED threat without ending the insurgency. Technology can mitigate some of the threat, but even the greatest technology has limits.

So well said. So sad. so true.

Don’t buy into the Dragonskin hype which was NBC’s attempt to create controversy.

Neither armor is inherently better, but there are differences. The two main problems with Dragonskin are that it is significantly heavier (58 pounds, vs 28 for the Army-issue interceptor) and it’s very difficult to replace the small disks once they’ve been damaged. With interceptor, you just slide a new plate in.

The weight, though, is a huge factor. 20 extra pounds is a lot when guys are carrying 80-100 pounds of gear in 120 degree heat. We could probably make troops nigh invulnerable to small-arms fire, but then they couldn’t move and would die of heat stroke. In a combat environment, many other factors besides protection must be considered. Dragonskin simply does not provide enough added benefits to justify the huge increase in weight – it’s as simple as that.

As for the MRAP debate, a couple of other points. First of all, most of these vehicles are made by small firms who only had production capability to build a handful a year. Ramping up production to produce thousands in a short period of time is no easy task, even when the government acquisition wheels have been greased. It is a similar situation to the armor kits for Hummers. When IED’s became a problem we suddenly needed thousands of armor kits, but the company that made them was only setup to produce a limited number.

Even when the MRAPs get fielded, insurgents will find ways to take them out. There was a decrease in IED casualties when armored hummers became common, but then EFP’s were introduced and insurgents developed new tactics through trial-and-error to defeat it. The same will happen with MRAPs. Every combat system has weaknesses and eventually insurgents will find that weakness and exploit it. It’s the nature of warfare.

Despite our deepest desires, there is no way to end the IED threat without ending the insurgency. Technology can mitigate some of the threat, but even the greatest technology has limits.

This “can’t do” attitude, aided and abetted by a pernicious and arrogant defense secretary, is absolutely unacceptable and, as I said, is criminal.

I think the phrase that most aptly describes the entirety of this administration is, “The Buck Don’t Stop Here!”

Snark aside, this is criminal. There’s just no other words to describe it. Our soldiers may have signed their lives over to the defense of our country, but that doesn’t mean our government or the military higher-ups should treat that commitment lightly. And this sort of neglect suggests they are doing exactly that.

Thank you.

Jim:

Fascinating but not surprising.

As it is, a major chokepoint in manufacturing MRAPs is that there is only one contractor with a very limited production capacity.

I will guarantee you that manufacturer is politically connected and I will also guarantee you that efforts to farm out additional manufacturing have been rebuffed.

Since I often bash you on these threads, I would like to say I think you’re 100% correct here.

Remember, Iraq is the primary battleground in the GWOT, or that’s the big lie we’ve been fed from Day Two, the justifications made on Day One having been utterly and totally undermined.

This “can’t do” attitude, aided and abetted by a pernicious and arrogant defense secretary, is absolutely unacceptable and, as I said, is criminal.

Itis hard to purchase a new family of military vehilces on a one year time horizon. What ends up happening is that the vehicle/weapon system/electronic gadget may be purchase but the spare parts are not, no one knows how to maintain the vehicles, the vehicles have different battery, fuel, and oil requirements, and the systems quickly become useless.