Garner’s timetable matched the military instructions that the Pentagon issued in early May to its top commander in Iraq, General David McKiernan, to accelerate redeployment plans in order to make possible an August withdrawal. And his desire to quickly establish an Iraqi interim government reflected what high administration officials were also promising. In an April 13 interview on Meet the Press, Rumsfeld defined the challenge as enabling the Iraqi people to “come together in one way or another and select an interim authority of some kind. That that group will propose a constitution and a more permanent authority of some kind. And over some period of months, the Iraqis will have their government selected by the Iraqi people.” On the same program, Ahmed Chalabi predicted that Garner’s job of restoring basic services would be done in a few weeks, and then an interim authority “of Iraqis, chosen by Iraqis,” would take power. In subsequent weeks, a steady drumbeat of other officials — including Rice, Wolfowitz, and President Bush himself — reiterated that an Iraqi interim government would be constituted as soon as possible.

Viewed from hindsight, this passage makes clear the naivety and even outright incompetence of U.S. planning for Iraq’s transition. But it also makes clear that your interpretation, Chris, is completely wrong in two ways. First, it shows how the U.S. was foreseeing elections by Iraqis of an Iraqi government. No mention can be found in the evidence of the “veto power” or “client state” you assert was the goal. Second, it shows that the U.S. was from the very beginning trying to find a way to get out as soon as possible. There is no evidence of the plan for “permanent bases” in a strategic position between Jordan and Iran as you asserted.

There’s just nothing I can find in the evidence to back up your claims, Chris, and this is even though I am doing your work for you in going through the evidence. You yourself have offered no evidence at all, and neither did Shaun in his original post.

“Privately that fall [2003], Bush administration officials were more worried than they let on in public. Officials at the White House, Pentagon, and State Department began the week of September 8 puzzling over an op-ed piece by Bremer that had appeared in the Washington Post that Monday morning. According to some accounts, the article blindsided Bush administration officials back in Washington. In it Bremer laid out a plan for a lengthy, seven-step roadmap to end the U.S. occupation. It actually boiled down to three major goals, in order: First, a constitution would be written and ratified by the Iraqis. Next would come a national election. Only after that would the U.S. occupation authority be dissolved…
“Bremer’s plan had one huge flaw: It lacked essential support both in the United States and in Iraq. ‘Bremer hadn’t cleared the piece with his higher-ups in the Pentagon or the White House., and here he was describing a drawn-out occupation,’ columnist avid Brooks reported ten months later in the New York Times. “Iraqis would take their time writing a constitution, and would eventually have elections and take control of their country. For some Bush officials, this was the lowest point of the entire Iraq project. They knew they couldn’t sustain an occupation for that long, yet they had no other realistic plan for transferring power to the Iraqis…
“In a series of meetings with Rumsfeld, and then with Rice and Bush at the White House, Bremer and the Bush administration reconsidered the mission of the CPA, and ultimately decided to abandon the idea of having the United States formally occupt Iraq for several years. The seven-step plan was dropped. On November 15, Bremer unveiled a new, swifter plan that abandoned the goal of having a constitution and general elections before the U.S. government relinquished sovereignty. Instead, the United States would officially hand over power less than eight months later, at the end of June 2004…
“It was indeed a major reversal: Instead of a long-term occupation, the U.S. government would seek to depart as humanely as possible. ‘It was clear that Plan A wasn’t going to work,’ said Patrick Clawson, an Iraq hawk who had argued for limited goals…,”it was the first time we pulled back dramatically from objectives. I read that as the first time we said we weren’t going to achieve everything we said we wanted to do.” (Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, pp. 254-255)

Now that doesn’t sound much like a drive for permanent control or permanent military bases in 2003 to me. That sounds like “lets get the hell out of here as quick as we can”. Once again, the available evidence leads to the opposite conclusion as that asserted (without any evidence, I might add) by Chris and/or Shaun.

Remember, in 2003, Bush still opposed elections in Iraq.

Untrue.

I’ve been reading all kinds of histories from the 2001-2005 period in the last several months for dissertation work. I’m confident that you cannot prove this assertion true.

Its also completely irrelevant to your other contentions about alleged U.S. plans for permanent military bases regardless of what the Iraqi government says. You should take up bullfighting, as you appear quite proficient in waving red flags around in attempts to distract.

Jason,
Remember, in 2003, Bush still opposed elections in Iraq.

So what? We’re still waiting for you to explain exactly how GWB will establish “permanent” bases in Iraq in the 18 months he has left in office.

“The United States is planning a long-term military relationship with the emerging government of Iraq, one that would grant the Pentagon access to military bases and project American influence into the heart of the unsettled region

Even Chris’ own quotations refute his argument.

You are nothing if not persistent in your beliefs, no matter how thin the evidence.

First of all, that article was written back in 2003, in the midst of the “major combat operations” portion of the war. At that time, it was assumed by the administration that the post-war cleanup would be no big deal, that Chalabi or some other supposedly friendly US patsy would replace Saddam and that Iraq would be a largely peaceful place and friendly to US interests. If that had actually happened, then a case could certainly be made that long-term bases in Iraq could be a strategic force for the US in the region – even beyond the extensive bases we already (and still do) use. But a lot has transpired since then hasn’t it? What might have been bases that would be a strategic advantage to the US are now strategic liabilities. In any conflict with Iran or Syria, their proxies inside Iraq could interdict supply lines and add to the already heavy stream of mortar and rocket fire that visits these bases daily. Any base, no matter how “permanent” is not a strategic asset when it’s in a country wracked by insurgency and a low-level civil war. It becomes impossible in the midst of a full-fledge civil war which is at the very least a possibility in Iraq after a significant US drawdown.

In addition to that, you must believe that every President and Congress following GWB will be like lemmings and blindly follow the “permanent bases” policy no matter what the reality on the ground may indicate. By the same token you seem to ignore the repeated statements of administration officials that the US would leave if asked to do so and seem to assume that future administrations would simply ignore such requests if they came. And all that to enforce these bases which are ultimately strategic liabilities for the US in the region.

Like every other country, the US will maintain a presence in Iraq so long as the host government gives its ok and as long as it serves American interests. I said about 10 years because that’s likely how long it will take to (based on historical examples) to finish the COIN mission and bring some semblance of peace the the nation, provided it’s even possible at this point (if it’s not possible, we’ll be out a lot sooner than 10 years). So it seems rather fantastic that you and others continue to follow this ridiculous “permanent” bases theory as if US policy and situational realities will not change over the next 5, 10 or 40 years. Like I said before, unless there is some kind of binding treaty, a la GITMO, to legalize a unilateral US presence in Iraq as along as we wish, then all this “permanent” bases amounts to naught but a hill of partisan political beans. If an article from 2003 (which has been, to use a military vernacular, “overtaken by events”) is the best evidence you can muster, then your argument is pretty weak in the evidentiary department.

As for the “news” on the “Korea model” it is but speculation. I hope I don’t have to educate you about the fundamental differences between the situations in Korea in the 1950′s and Iraq today to demonstrate the flawed thinking and premises behind implementation of a “Korea model.” In short, it is so obviously a square peg attempting to fit into the “round hole” of Iraq.

Given everything I’ve said in this thread on the subject, I’ll as you the same question I asked Shaun (who hasn’t yet answered): Please lay out exactly how GWB is going to keep a “permanent” presence in Iraq?

The news recently has been about the “Korea model” being used. 30-50k troops in Iraq for decades.

And this idea isn’t exactly new, especially not for people who’ve read Ricks book.

There is also this:

On April 19, 2003, soon after American troops entered Baghdad, Times’ reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt had a striking front-page piece headlined, “Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in Iraq.” It began:

“The United States is planning a long-term military relationship with the emerging government of Iraq, one that would grant the Pentagon access to military bases and project American influence into the heart of the unsettled region, senior Bush administration officials say. American military officials, in interviews this week, spoke of maintaining perhaps four bases in Iraq that could be used in the future: one at the international airport just outside Baghdad; another at Tallil, near Nasiriya in the south; the third at an isolated airstrip called H-1 in the western desert, along the old oil pipeline that runs to Jordan; and the last at the Bashur air field in the Kurdish north.”

http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174807/how_permanent_are_those_bases_

Who on earth finds a US naval presence in the Persian Gulf, where so much oil traffic the developed world depends on, and which is threatened by Iran, a bad thing, other than the Iranian government? What is the real nature of any opposition to it here in the West?

The big candidates in both parties are on board with keeping bases there “forever.” It’s actually a lot easier to do, if the government of Iraq collapses.

No, it is not a lot “easier” to do, particularly if one knows anything about military logistics. If we do have any kind of long-term bases in Iraq they will likely be in Kurdish areas, or in the south near Kuwait and therefore close to our real “permanent” bases in Kuwait. Bases, particularly ones that will supposedly have a an entire division of forces, require a lot of supply, which requires convoys, which requires defending those convoys. If the Iraqi government collapses, and Iraq turns into an even greater chaotic bloodbath, keeping 50k troops supplied in places like Camp Victory and Balad will be, shall we say, a tremendous challenge. It’s certainly a much more difficult endeavor than the current situation.

And Chris, I see little evidence the US wants bases in Iraq “forever” beyond your fervent belief that it must be true, unless 10 years is a new definition for “forever.”

Bush is only the biggest part of this picture.

I find it abso-forking-lutely quaint that you take President Bush at his word. You go guy!

Well Shaun, you were the one that said “no one in the White House or Pentagon is willing to go on the record” right? Bush is “on the record” regarding permanent bases even if he is lying. I was simply pointing out that administration officials, including the President himself, have gone “on the record” on this issue.

And, if he is lying, he’s only got 18 months left in office – so he can make the bases “permanent” for exactly 18 months. That’s a fact that does not rely on Bush’s honesty. Then there are all the other practical considerations I laid out above. Given all that, I would really like you to lay out exactly how GWB is going to keep a “permanent” presence in Iraq?

I find it abso-forking-lutely quaint that you take President Bush at his word. You go guy!

You and I are having this discussion in a virtual vacuum because no one in the White House or Pentagon is willing to go on the record about the end game in Iraq. This makes Ricks’ story all the more compelling.

The “end game?” How is anyone to know what the “end game” will look like? How can anyone predict with certainty what will be the best “end game,” when it will occur, what forces may, or may not, be required to implement it, and what forces may, or may not, be required to defend US interests in Iraq or any other conflict? Clinton, for example, did not announce an “end game” for Bosia or Kosovo – a certain date that America would disengage no matter what the situation on the ground. We eventually did when the time and situation called for it but it’s impossible to determine that years in advance, which is what you seem to be demanding of the Bush Administration.

And President Bush himself has said that if the Iraqi’s want us out, we will leave. What more do you want than that?

Davebo,

What’s your opinion of our current Status of Forces agreement in Iraq.

Oh, wait, we don’t have one. Can you name a single instance where US troops, even a dozen, are stationed in a country without a Status of Forces agreement?

You’re right. And you know what? No SOFA is an argument against our having a “permanent” presence! We negotiate SOFA agreements when we know we will be there long-term.

And perhaps you should also examine the history of SOFA’s. When did we get a SOFA with the ROK (Korea)? 1966. When did we get one with Japan? 1960. In other words, we negotiated them once it became clear we would be there for a long time and once both countries had somewhat stable governments that have total administrative control of their nation’s territory – something that doesn’t yet exist in Iraq. If the Iraqi government so desired, they could demand a SOFA agreement tomorrow – or at least when they returned from their “vacation.”

Chris,

And left a huge carrier battlegroup right off the coast.

We’ve had a carrier battlegroup in the Persian Gulf almost continually since 1990, so what’s your point? In any event, they operate in international waters and have every right to do so.

I hear that assertion quite frequently, but where is the evidence for it? You might be right if Bush and his cronies were in office “permanently” but of course they are not. US officials have already said that the US will leave if the Iraqi government asks it to. Until I see a 99-year lease with exclusive rights to unilaterally renew it, I certainly won’t be calling the US presence “permanent.”

Yes, I think this view is correct. The historical evidence certainly favors Entropy’s view over Shaun’s. Except in the historically unusual circumstance of Cuba, since World War II, the U.S. has left military bases when told to do so by the host government. When France withdrew from military participation in NATO, the U.S. abandoned large military bases in France and its colonies on a very short timetable. And when the Philippines refused to renew the lease on Clark and Subic, the U.S. left.

Shaun’s position is an argument from assumption — they know that the U.S. seeks permanent bases in Iraq regardless of the wishes of the Iraqi government because, well, they just know. Its not a very persuasive case except to those that already share its negative view of the United States.