Question is though, have we learned how to affect the internal dynamics in a positive way? Will conditional support through benchmarks (and regional diplomacy) possibly have that effect, and if so, should we support continuing the surge in order to provide that positive multiplier effect?

And honestly I can’t understand those who are claiming that there’s no evidence of the US involvement being important here.

CS, here and throughout the war in general I think we are very important. The problem is that I think we are completely captive to the internal dynamics and work as a multiplier on what is going on already. When they are positive, we make it a lot more positive; when they are negative, we make it a lot worse.

It’s like we’re a supertanker but the Iraqis have the helm.

And honestly I can’t understand those who are claiming that there’s no evidence of the US involvement being important here. The whole article is full of instances where the US forces have had a postive influence; you’d have to be reading very selectively to miss it.

The awakening started in Ramadi and has now spread to Hit, Haditha and points west to the West bank of the Euphrates just north of Fallujah and then to the south near Amariyah/Ferris.

The exact same banding against Al Qaeda in these towns has been reported at least three or four times during the course of the war, only to see gains reversed. It seems to be from a variety of factors: assassination of the leaders against Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda recognizing over reach and stepping back and most importantly, the Shiites start killing more people again.

It is no coincidence that the cooperation occured during a lull in sectarian Shia on Sunni violence. Unfortunately this violence seems to be ramping up again. I’ve read several accounts that report overt attacks by the police are on the rise. The second that the tribes have less to fear from Al Qaeda if they cooperate I wouldn’t be surprised if the situation reverses entirely.

Combined with targeted assassinations against those that still want to fight and events like this:

In other violence, gunmen in Samarra, 60 miles north of Baghdad, set up fake checkpoints on the outskirts of the city and abducted more than 40 people, most of them soldiers, police officers and members of two tribes that had banded together against local insurgents, according to a police official in the city. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he feared retribution.

I just don’t see this being a new pattern since we are so tied up.

I don’t think you can come anywhere close to demonstrating that the effects you’re point to are a result of the cause you’re supporting. For one thing, it’s not established that the effects will last. For another, it’s not known whether the Iraqis involved in these effects are in league with Iraqis we’re known to be supporting, much less why they have now stepped up, assuming they have only just now stepped up, which we also don’t really know.

I’m not saying it’s impossible that the surge could work, but I am saying there’s very little here to change my assessment of it’s being very improbable.

The notion of “maybe the Surge will work” still seems to me akin to “maybe this lotto ticket is a winner.” There is first the overwhelming logical issue of why we weren’t doing this earlier if the tactic has the potential for success it’s supporters are arguing for. Second the absence of any recommendation of this strategy from Baker-Hamilton. And add to these, the difficulty of wading through tendentious claims that “it’s working” (which this appears not even to be an example of).

While it’s good that Anbar has improved, the news isn’t particularly useful. And the negative inference I draw (American efforts aren’t working [eg, Surge] – only the will of the Iraqis can improve things, as they did in Anbar) doesn’t bode well for the efficacy of our efforts.