Critical Views
About Iraq. An example:
JD in Karma:
“In fact, there is a civil war in progress in Iraq, one comparable in important respects to other civil wars that have occurred in postcolonial states with weak institutions. Those cases suggest that the Bush administration’s political objective in Iraq–creating a stable, peaceful, somewhat democratic regime that can survive the departure of U.S. troops–is unrealistic.†Professor James D. Fearon, writing in the March/April edition of Foreign Affairs.
There is one problem with Professor Fearon’s thesis–the facts on the ground that I am seeing right now and that he has not seen in person or not seen recently.
Jules comments: “Read what J.D. has to say about what is happening in the cities, towns and villages of Anbar. Remember that this is the place that was written off as a lost cause as recently as six months ago.”
I think that it is important for all of us to read the ‘good news’ from Iraq, as well as the bad news. The MSM spend a lot of time of what is going wrong in Iraq, and rightfully so, but the surge seems to be working, at least in some ways and in some areas. This should also get attention.
In the end, this is not a partisan issue: it is a humane issue. We should treat it as such. Whether it is beneficial for one politically to declare victory in Iraq, or defeat, should not matter. Lets therefore also spend attention to both the good and the bad news.
14 Responses to “Critical Views”
Good point, Michael. Agreed.
You know Pete: I am a critic of the surge, but what if it does work? We have to keep an eye on the good news, it might work (Lord knows I have been wrong in the past so who knows?).
Michael,
I have read the linked article and found it very interesting. I always value direct sources over pundits and this seems like a pretty direct source. From the text itself, though, I’m not sure I would categorize this as ‘good news’. A secure village is a good thing, and it’s good to see a sort of tissue rejection of al Qaeda happening. Still, the author himself claims that situations change so rapidly that information posted (even his) may become irrelevant soon thereafter. Honesty which lends authority to his voice in my opinion, but unavoidably leads us to wonder how permanent this good news will be. Also, and more importantly in my opinion, the author points to the Sunni/Shia split and the prospect of a real civil war irregardless of al Qaeda’s influence or lack thereof. That seems to be the real issue for the stability of Iraq.
Thanks for a thought provoking and enlightening link.
I didn’t see anything in the Anbar article linking particular American efforts to the rehabilitation of the town. From my quick read, the article suggested that the Iraqis will come around whenever the hell they feel like it.
While it’s good that Anbar has improved, the news isn’t particularly useful. And the negative inference I draw (American efforts aren’t working [eg, Surge] – only the will of the Iraqis can improve things, as they did in Anbar) doesn’t bode well for the efficacy of our efforts.
No problem OOC, glad you found it interesting.
I agree with jpe–there doesn’t seem to be anything there for the US to take credit for.
The notion of “maybe the Surge will work” still seems to me akin to “maybe this lotto ticket is a winner.” There is first the overwhelming logical issue of why we weren’t doing this earlier if the tactic has the potential for success it’s supporters are arguing for. Second the absence of any recommendation of this strategy from Baker-Hamilton. And add to these, the difficulty of wading through tendentious claims that “it’s working” (which this appears not even to be an example of).
Remember, as I wrote about a couple of weeks ago, if the Iraqis start stepping up, that is evidence of “the surge” working. The “surge” is intended to make Iraqi forces more willing to fight and to make Iraqi political groups more willing to establish order. So if there is an area of Anbar that has been pacified, I for one could care less about the U.S. “taking credit”. It is evidence that something is being done right and that there may finally open a route for this whole mess to end on less than completely disastrous terms.
Let me just quickly say that I’m disappointed in my use of the non-word ‘irregardless’ in my comment above. Minor point, but it’s important to me.
Jason Remember, as I wrote about a couple of weeks ago, if the Iraqis start stepping up, that is evidence of “the surge†working. The “surge†is intended to make Iraqi forces more willing to fight and to make Iraqi political groups more willing to establish order.
I don’t think you can come anywhere close to demonstrating that the effects you’re point to are a result of the cause you’re supporting. For one thing, it’s not established that the effects will last. For another, it’s not known whether the Iraqis involved in these effects are in league with Iraqis we’re known to be supporting, much less why they have now stepped up, assuming they have only just now stepped up, which we also don’t really know.
I’m not saying it’s impossible that the surge could work, but I am saying there’s very little here to change my assessment of it’s being very improbable.
I hope the trend continues, but I’m very pessimistic.
The exact same banding against Al Qaeda in these towns has been reported at least three or four times during the course of the war, only to see gains reversed. It seems to be from a variety of factors: assassination of the leaders against Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda recognizing over reach and stepping back and most importantly, the Shiites start killing more people again.
It is no coincidence that the cooperation occured during a lull in sectarian Shia on Sunni violence. Unfortunately this violence seems to be ramping up again. I’ve read several accounts that report overt attacks by the police are on the rise. The second that the tribes have less to fear from Al Qaeda if they cooperate I wouldn’t be surprised if the situation reverses entirely.
Combined with targeted assassinations against those that still want to fight and events like this:
I just don’t see this being a new pattern since we are so tied up.
jjc,
Neither Baker nor Hamilton have been critical of the surge plan and both have spoken about the elements of it which do draw on their recommendations. Of course, you may not have heard this because to my recollection only Fox covered it: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,248738,00.html
And honestly I can’t understand those who are claiming that there’s no evidence of the US involvement being important here. The whole article is full of instances where the US forces have had a postive influence; you’d have to be reading very selectively to miss it.
CS, here and throughout the war in general I think we are very important. The problem is that I think we are completely captive to the internal dynamics and work as a multiplier on what is going on already. When they are positive, we make it a lot more positive; when they are negative, we make it a lot worse.
It’s like we’re a supertanker but the Iraqis have the helm.
Yes, I agree (and I was just rereading Baker and Hamilton’s comments on the surge and their ISG recommendations and they pretty much said the same thing- that no matter how you slice it, we’re at the mercy of what the Iraqis will do).
Question is though, have we learned how to affect the internal dynamics in a positive way? Will conditional support through benchmarks (and regional diplomacy) possibly have that effect, and if so, should we support continuing the surge in order to provide that positive multiplier effect?
Continued support for the surge will be justified if and only if it can be shown to be working by actual benchmarks, not just anecdotes. Petreaus’ report in September is supposed to be based on such benchmarks, so that will be the key opportunity. I just hope that Congress is willing to listen to the information and doesn’t make up its mind in advance to only see bad news.