What the Hostage Crisis Says about Iran
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the recent British hostage crisis: most importantly, bilateral talks combined with face-saving measures is the best way to deal with Iran.
This dispute says a lot about the Iranians and about how we should be engaging with them. First, this crisis has made it quite clear that threatening the Iranian regime will not work. When Blair threatened to take this issue to “the next phase” if the hostages were not released, he only worsened the conflict. Most analysts in Tehran agree on this point, according to The Financial Times. Indeed, Blair’s hostile language had the opposite effect of what he hoped: it caused the mullahs to dig in their heels. (It’s critical to remember that the Iranian regime is very prideful. They have shown time and again that they will not back down in the face of military posturing.)
Second, this crisis indicates that the best way to engage with Iran is through direct, bilateral talks. Blair, once he dropped the rhetoric of instigating a military response and instead began to initiate a dialogue with Iran, was able to bring about a resolution to the dispute. Working through intermediaries like the UN, or relying on indirect communication with the Iranians would not have worked, many analysts agree.
Third, face-saving measures are a key element of successful negotiations with Iran. Because of the prideful nature of the Iranian regime, allowing them to paint the outcome as a win is extremely important. Juan Cole, an expert on Middle Eastern politics, makes the same point. He says: “Iran politics—and this is generally true of politics on the whole—is all about saving face.…” Britain’s pledge not to enter Iran’s territorial waters allowed the Iranian government to save face and led to the release of the hostages, Cole argues.
These lessons are important and we should remember them when we think about how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program. Threats have proven to be very ineffective, as many months of tough talk and military posturing has indicated. Rather than causing Iran to moderate its position, the aggressive approach taken by the US has only increased Iranian domestic support for the program and furthered the resolve of the Iranian mullahs.
A more effective approach to the Iranian nuclear program would involve continued one-on-one negotiations between the EU (or the US) and Iran, as well as a scaling down of threatening rhetoric. Furthermore, as the recent hostage crisis makes clear, it’s crucial that the Iranian regime is given a face-saving way of giving up its nuclear ambitions. If they can’t frame it as a win, Iran will not go along with any such deal. Juan Cole draws some similar conclusions:
The successful British diplomacy around the sailors was direct bilateral talks and face-saving pronouncements. So that seems to be what works with this regime. If the Europeans can find a way to speak directly to the Iranians and to frame the [issue of nuclear] suspension in a way that doesn’t seem to injure Iranian feelings about national sovereignty, then it’s not impossible that they could have a suspension.
(Cross-posted at Foreign Policy Watch)
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15 Responses to “What the Hostage Crisis Says about Iran”
Jeb, what is the limit on what you’d let Iran do to someone and still let them call it a win? What if they’d done what they did in waters that everyone except Iran recognizes as either international waters or someone else’s territory? What if they’d just sunk the boats? Should it still have been “Oh, we’re sorry. You’re right to have done what you did.”? Where is the line between what you’re suggesting and appeasement?
Frankly I don’t think all of the ass-kissing and negotiations in the world are going to stop the Iranians from getting nuclear weapons because that’s what the Revolutionary Guard wants. And not for defense either. A more likely scenario is that once they have a nuclear arsenal of any size they bully their way into dominating the region. War with Israel, anyone? They certainly don’t think the U.S. would dare to intervene once they have nukes. I made a simple post about it here.
All that you say is good from the “realist” perspective. The problem is that Bush and Cheney are stubborn and will not give up their unilateral and idealogue approach. I fear they are in denial and a holding pattern and will leave all their problems to the next administration. W can’t have his library or think tank in Texas tagged with a loser label.
Jim – It’s not appeasement, it’s just smart policy. The other route that we’ve been taking (negotiations coupled with threats and increasing talk of a military attack) has proven itself to be completely unsuccessful. As I wrote above, the aggressive military posturing hasn’t led to any moderation of Iran’s stance. As in, we’re no closer to a solution than we were several years ago.
I think that this crisis indicates that we need a different approach. What proved successful here might well prove successful with regards to the nuclear dispute.
I am, by no means, saying we shouldn’t be putting pressure on Iran. We should be. But military pressure is not the way to go. The mullahs have shown that they will not back down it. It’s time to try a different approach, one that has actually shown itself to work.
Jeb, your analysis has one flaw in it: you assume the aim is to avoid military conflict. That was also Blair’s aim as well, once he got off his high-horse.
But that is not the aim of the Bush Administration, nor of its supporters. They want a military conflict with Iran. Pointing out normative political methodology as a way to resolve conflicts with minimal damage is the opposite of what they want to hear, and do.
I think you’re overstating the matter, Jeb. Neither you nor I actually know what was said to the Iranians nor the reasons for the Iranian response. I think a somewhat more modest claim is more defensible: the Iranians do respond to pressure, but perhaps not in the way we might hope.
I am very much in favor of bilateral negotations with Iran that contain both real sticks and real carrots as an alternative to the military confrontation that the combination of empty threats and paternalism from the West we’ve seen so far is leading us—I’ve got years of posts on the subject. But the notion that no stick will have any effect on Iran is fatuous.
BTW there’s no need to pad Dr. Cole’s resume. He’s probably the greatest English-language authority on Shi’ism and, given the interaction between religion and politics, particularly in the Middle East he has some authority in that area as well. However, his credentials on Middle Eastern politics are a little iffier. Why not just characterize him as what he is, without spin? A leading expert on 20th century Middle Eastern religious movements.
So the best way to resolve a crisis with Iran is to preserve Iranian face by sacrificing our own. Yes, Iranian prestige was preserved and all it took was British humiliation.
One wonders if you’d come to the same conclusion if the British had kidnapped Iranian military personnel inside Iranian territorial waters, paraded them on TV, coerced and tricked them into bogus confessions and then, when the propaganda value and humiliation were at their greatest, released them in a show of “friendliness.”
Apparently, only Iranian face is worth saving and aggressors who commit aggressive acts should be provided every opportunity to exploit their criminal act while saving face at the same time. Perhaps we should provide Syria a way to save face after assassinating the former leader of Lebanon as well.
If the Europeans can find a way to speak directly to the Iranians and to frame the [issue of nuclear] suspension in a way that doesn’t seem to injure Iranian feelings about national sovereignty, then it’s not impossible that they could have a suspension.
While this seems reasonablem one only has to look at the absolute mess their economy is in. They desperately need nuclear energy to stave off total collapse. Therefore unless we can stave off economic collapse for them then they are surely not going to give in to the demands of ending their Nuke program.
Which then goes to the point. Trading Nukes for Refineries. Gasoline Subsidies guaranteed by the west.
The issue becomes how do you trust them when one minute they say they are going to make nukes to destroy Israel and the next we just want peace. I for one sincerely believe they do want nuclear energy. Their economy demands it. On the other hand I do not believe they are capable of taking care of such a powerful tool as Nuclear energy. They would end up burying the Fuel rods in the Persian Gulf, or simply burying them in sand and radiating their own people.
Nuclear fuel is about their economic solvency. Until you assuage their sincere belief that they are going broke you will never frame an argument that will allow them to end nuke produciton.
Hogwash. The Iranians have exactly ONE nuclear power plant under construction, which won’t be fueled and operational for a couple of years. One reactor will do little to solve Iranian energy problems. Although Iran has said it intends to build lots of reactors, it has yet to contract for them, much less begin construction. Considering reactors take about a decade to build, one wonders why Iran would put so much of it’s time and effort into its nuclear program when it faces such a clear short-term energy crisis. Much of Iran’s nuclear program is not even about power generation – the Arak complex being just one example.
The economics of Iran’s nuclear program are clear, and Iran’s claims and actions don’t support Iran’s stated goals.
The issue of the importance of saving face brings up one aspect of Iran’s nuclear power program which I rarely see discussed: its historical perspective.
Under the Shah, beginning in 1957, Iran was working with the US and European countries to develop its nuclear generating capacity, envisioning 20 nuclear power plants.
Work began on the Bushehr plant in 1974.
This co-operation, of course, came to an end with the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Strategic considerations aside, I strongly suspect that the continued support for nuclear development among the Iranian people and their rulers is, at least in part, founded in a desire to reclaim and surpass the Shah’s legacy.
Iran suffers, in effect, from an inferiority complex.
Which puts Ahmadinejad’s bluster in perspective, and explains, as pointed out in by any number of observers, why Iran tends to dig in its heels when publicly threatened.
This leads me to believe that negotiations with Iran are not best served by public threats, but by quiet diplomacy.
Wikipedia timeline of Iran’s nuclear development here.
Actually, within reason I don’t think we should have a problem with this, Entropy. We (and the Brits) have a Guilt Culture; the Iranians have a Shame Culture. “Face” i.e. repute has more value to them than it does to us.
The essence of an exchange is that you trade something which you value relatively less for something you value relatively more. When face-saving is a relatively high value for the Iranians than it is for us, it offers us the opportunity of getting something we want, in this case the hostages, for something we don’t value nearly as highly i.e. repute.
Dave,
I would agree with you but for one thing – this incident was instigated by Iran. They created a situation which required us to become humiliated to allow them to save face. It would be different if there were a genuine misunderstanding, or the Brits had actually erred. How can anyone argue this is a model for negotiating with Iran?
Iran got something for nothing in this case. They got to humiliate the West; reinforce a continuing perception in the ME that the West is weak; buttress domestic political support; show the world and the region that criminal behavior pays. They may even have gotten Iranian IRGC officers captured in Iraq released. What did the Brits get in return? Humiliation bordering on national shame. Oh, and their hostages who never should have been kidnapped in the first place.
CK,
I’m very familiar with the Iranian nuclear program. The US and Western assistance to Iran before the revolution never included a domestic enrichment program or enrichment technology. Iran was going to build a bunch of nuclear reactors and supply them with US and possibly URENCO fuel, which is pretty standard as far as nuclear cooperation goes.
Fast forward to the current Iranian nuclear program. The rhetoric on building reactors is still there, but Iran spends virtually all it’s money on a clandestine enrichment program. When Iran masters the technology, they will have sunk billions into an enrichment program to provide fuel for one small reactor. There’s plenty of LWR fuel on the international market these days – why would Iran not build reactors first, meet its legitimate energy needs, and then consider enrichment? Instead the keep on reactor project around for political cover and pour their resources into enrichment – A program that would still be clandestine if not for Libyan exposure of the AQ Khan network.
And that leaves aside the issue of Arak – the heavy water reactor that, when complete, is optimal for plutonium production. It should come as no surprise that the design of the ARAK reactor is virtually identical to those used by Israel, India and Pakistan for their plutonium programs.
In short, Iran’s stated goal of nuclear energy does not match its actions. It’s about to have an energy crisis, yet it’s building nuclear infrastructure that does nothing to address that crisis. If the Bushehr reactor is so critical to Iranian energy needs, why can’t they pay the Russians on time to complete it? It’s telling that their enrichment program suffers no apparant funding shortfalls.
Read the DOE paper I linked in my previous comment for details on the economics of the Iranian nuclear program.
Well, I think negotition is good. But we need to start with a more relaisitc end game. Afaik legally (by treaty) they are able to enrich despite our strong desire otherwise.
Perhaps a face saving compromise? A a push for heavy water CANDU reactors (no enrichment needed) would be a good start… Iran gets to walk away crowing about having nuclear power and we get our no enrichment…
Jeb,
I was asking a serious question. Notice I didn’t say that what you were saying was appeasement. I seriously asked where is the line where it does become appeasement.
That would be true if Iran were in compliance with their obligations under the NNPT. They haven’t been in compliance for quite some time and their nuclear development activities (whatever they may be) ceased being legal when they were found to be out of compliance.
There is some legitimate dispute. Iran’s argument follows the strict letter of the NPT to justify it’s activities and by doing so they basically expect the international community to wipe away and forget about over two decades of Iranian noncompliance and deception. Then there is the problem of what constitutes “peaceful nuclear technology” under the NPT. Enrichment is a dual-use technology, so Iran’s intent becomes the heart of the problem. The combination of questions about Iran’s intent along with it’s longstanding deception have obviously caused a lot of skepticism in the west, and virtually everyone but Iran agrees that Iran needs to go beyond the strict letter of the NPT to ensure it is not hiding any other clandestine activities. In other words, the world community believes the onus is on Iran to provide a great amount of transparency because of it’s lack of credibility.
Iran is pursuing both a heavy-water technology that does not rely on enrichment as well as LWR’s using LEU fuel. Iran has stated it has plans to develop indigenous HWR and even pressurized heavy water reactors. For now, though, it’s just working on the Arak “research” reactor which could be quickly and easily configured for plutonium production. So to answer your question, the Iranians will not accept CANDU in lieu of enrichment – they may accept CANDU in addition to enrichment, but even that is suspect since they have stated their intent to use an indigenous design. In either event, CANDU would be a dangerous design to give to the Iranians as it would give them a reliable source of tritium.