Iraq & The Waiting Game
As noted by Yours Truly after President Bush’s speech on Iraq the other night, a big reason that the “new” strategy won’t work is that the bad guys will simply wait until it plays itself out.
As if on cue, Leila Fadel and Zaineb Obeid of McClatchy Newspapers, which journo for journo may be doing the best work out of Iraq, report that:
“Mahdi Army militia members have stopped wearing their black uniforms, hidden their weapons and abandoned their checkpoints in an apparent effort to lower their profile in Baghdad in advance of the arrival of U.S. reinforcements.
“Militia members say (militant anti-American cleric and militia leader Moqtada] Al-Sadr ordered them to stand down shortly after President George Bush’s announcement that the U.S. would send 17,500 more American troops to Baghdad to work alongside the Iraqi security forces.
“The decision by al-Sadr to lower his force’s profile in Baghdad will likely cut violence in the city and allow American forces to show quick results from their beefed up presence. But it is also unlikely in the long term to change the balance of power here. Mahdi Army militiamen say that while they remain undercover now, they are simply waiting for the security plan to end.”
More here.
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9 Responses to “Iraq & The Waiting Game”
Whether or not the waiting game can prove successful for militants on either side depends on whether or not there is success in acheiving a degree of political reconciliation, economic stability and reconstruction.
As they say in Australia, that’s it in a bit.
And, I might add, an awfully tall order. The Mahdi Army, other militias and insurgents have a big stake in those things not happening unless it is on their terms.
Ahem.
Yes, Shaun, I agree that it is a very difficult task and that the Mahdi Army and other players have a stake in disrupting it, but the point is that forcing them into hiding gives a better playing field because we will engage them if they come out of hiding (when they attempt to disrupt) but we won’t be distracted by fighting them if they are just laying in wait. Of course it may prove too late for this to work, but at least I see some sliver of hope.
Actually, it is also an opportunity. The question, actually, is whether or not the U.S. is able to use this time, say 6 months, to rebuild those areas, to win the trust and support of the locals and to show them how peace is in their own benefit.
Not saying that all work out great, in fact, I think that – indeed – they will simply start fighting again after this plan, but it is an opportunity as well.
Michael, exactly. This just makes the “hold and build” element of the plan easier. And as this Washingtonpost article indicates, the reconstruction element should be more effective this time, as the administration has decided to listen to it’s former critics and adapt some of their ideas, and abandon previous disasterous ones.
Link didn’t work for some reason. I’ll use this instead
http://tinyurl.com/y9ckse (links to the Post article)
There are two separate issues here. In my understanding some areas are “occupied” or at least harboring external militias and in other areas they are just a native base. For example, all the foreign Al Qaeda type fighters can lose their base of support if the Sunnis feel like it is in their best interest — and many areas have and fought them themselves.
Other areas are occupied either by extreme Sunni or Shia tribes that don’t normally operate in the city. This has been happening in several areas in the south as they are being partitioned into pro-Sadr or pro-Badr locales. I’ve read several neighborhoods within Baghdad are like this well.
On the other hand, there are many strongholds (Sadr city, various neighborhoods in Baghdad, most of Anbar and a couple of cities in the south) where the militas aren’t a bane of the populace but a popular expression of it. Our assumptions seem to treat all militias as an occupying force that rules through fear or local confusion, but in many areas they are closer to Hezbollah or Hamas were they are seen as protectors and providers of social services.
The other assumption (in both Iraq and Afghanistan) is that all the citizens view themselves as individuals and thus just want peace and prosperity. While I’m sure the vast majority of them do, many of them also have tribal or religious alleigances where the leader has aspirations for power and thus their followers stand by them. If you read descriptions of attacks by Iraqis themselves (or occasionally it makes it into the news) they talk about “tribal conflict” as being separate from “sectarian conflict” or “insurgent/terrorist conflict.”
Jeff I find this quote from your link telling and fear it perfectly sums up the situation: “This man who had spent the last three years fighting the Americans was now willing to talk to them, not because he wanted to make peace but because he saw the Americans as the lesser of two evils.”
None of the groups (many of which form the government don’t forget) seem interested at genuine peace, only in an ebb and flow of violence in trying to gain the upper hand.
Er oops I meant Michael’s link from another post. I got distracted.