Comments on: The fundamental question http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/ An Internet hub with domestic and international news, analysis, original reporting, and popular features from the left, center, indies, centrists, moderates, and right Wed, 15 Feb 2012 07:08:41 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1.2 By: CStanley http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42568 CStanley Thu, 11 Jan 2007 14:41:12 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42568 <blockquote>“Ending the violence?� Well, don’t forget it’s the violence that makes Shiites support warlords like Al Sadr… “Stabilizing the country?� I guess those sectarian fanatics think the nation will be stabilized when the fighters of the other side are defeated. And of course they’re right, but it will cost a high price in blood. This doesn’t seem to matter for them anymore than the US casualty numbers matter to Bush.</blockquote> Yeah, well on both of these points, the only solution is for the Shiites to decide that countering Sunni violence with their own is not the answer. See, I disagree with you on point number two, they are NOT right in thinking that it will end when the other side is militarily defeated. Sectarian revenge cycles never really end. The Shiites have to find a way to end it politically instead. They have to decide to give up some of their political power in order to satisfy the Sunnis (the point about de-baathification is that the Sunnis have been shut out not only because of their minority status but also because so many of them have been prohibited from governing even if they had only tenuous ties to the Saddam govt. That has to change.)

“Ending the violence?�
Well, don’t forget it’s the violence that makes Shiites support warlords like Al Sadr…

“Stabilizing the country?�
I guess those sectarian fanatics think the nation will be stabilized when the fighters of the other side are defeated. And of course they’re right, but it will cost a high price in blood. This doesn’t seem to matter for them anymore than the US casualty numbers matter to Bush.

Yeah, well on both of these points, the only solution is for the Shiites to decide that countering Sunni violence with their own is not the answer. See, I disagree with you on point number two, they are NOT right in thinking that it will end when the other side is militarily defeated. Sectarian revenge cycles never really end. The Shiites have to find a way to end it politically instead. They have to decide to give up some of their political power in order to satisfy the Sunnis (the point about de-baathification is that the Sunnis have been shut out not only because of their minority status but also because so many of them have been prohibited from governing even if they had only tenuous ties to the Saddam govt. That has to change.)

]]> By: Gray http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42558 Gray Thu, 11 Jan 2007 14:13:22 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42558 "Ending the violence?" Well, don't forget it's the violence that makes Shiites support warlords like Al Sadr... "Stabilizing the country?" I guess those sectarian fanatics think the nation will be stabilized when the fighters of the other side are defeated. And of course they're right, but it will cost a high price in blood. This doesn't seem to matter for them anymore than the US casualty numbers matter to Bush. "Showing the rest of the world that it can confidently invest in the future of a stable Iraq?" Under Saddam, Iraq's economy was dominated by state owned enterprises. I guess it's a bit too much to expect economical wisdom from Iraqis at this point. “Ending the violence?”
Well, don’t forget it’s the violence that makes Shiites support warlords like Al Sadr…

“Stabilizing the country?”
I guess those sectarian fanatics think the nation will be stabilized when the fighters of the other side are defeated. And of course they’re right, but it will cost a high price in blood. This doesn’t seem to matter for them anymore than the US casualty numbers matter to Bush.

“Showing the rest of the world that it can confidently invest in the future of a stable Iraq?”
Under Saddam, Iraq’s economy was dominated by state owned enterprises. I guess it’s a bit too much to expect economical wisdom from Iraqis at this point.

]]> By: CStanley http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42554 CStanley Thu, 11 Jan 2007 13:56:59 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42554 <blockquote>What reason would they have to give away power to the hated Sunnis?</blockquote> Ending the violence? Stabilizing the country? Showing the rest of the world that it can confidently invest in the future of a stable Iraq? That's the crux of it. Does the Shiite majority understand this or not? We'll see. To paraphrase Golda Meir: "Peace will come when the Shiites love their own children more than they hate the Sunnis."

What reason would they have to give away power to the hated Sunnis?

Ending the violence? Stabilizing the country? Showing the rest of the world that it can confidently invest in the future of a stable Iraq?

That’s the crux of it. Does the Shiite majority understand this or not? We’ll see. To paraphrase Golda Meir: “Peace will come when the Shiites love their own children more than they hate the Sunnis.”

]]> By: Gray http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42552 Gray Thu, 11 Jan 2007 13:54:37 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42552 "the point is that there are better ways of insuring minority rights." Apropos, do you think the US has a good standing in demanding more rights for the political minority from foreign governments? I mean, it's not as if the US has provided a lot of positive examples for this in the last six years... “the point is that there are better ways of insuring minority rights.”

Apropos, do you think the US has a good standing in demanding more rights for the political minority from foreign governments? I mean, it’s not as if the US has provided a lot of positive examples for this in the last six years…

]]> By: Gray http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42548 Gray Thu, 11 Jan 2007 13:39:57 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42548 I see that we're not that far apart, CS. Even though it's useless to complain about spilled milk now, there are lessons to be learned for the failures and mistakes of the past. The main question is: Is there still time and opportunity to fix the mess? Imho, NO, but your mileage may vary. "On points #6 and #7, of course I understand that the issue is Shiite majority, but the point is that there are better ways of insuring minority rights." Well, the right idea to give Sunnis more political power would have been consequently implementing a federal structure for Iraq. This would have promoted democracy on a more regional level, and insured that Sunni regions aren't micromanged by a Shiite governemnt in Bagdad. But this train is long gone now, Iraq's constitution is as it is, describing a more centrally governed nation. I don't see how the clock can be turned back. Shiites obviously won't root for this idea now. What reason would they have to give away power to the hated Sunnis? So, this is a major obstacle towards pacifying Sunnis by giving them a higher level of participation in power. The US insistence on enhancing the political clout of the 20% minority of Sunnis not only contradicts the public pledge for spreading democracy, it's standing in the way of a stable government, which would naturally consist only of Shiites. I guess it's the misguided approach of a government of national unity that makes Maliki powerless and a suspicious figure on both sides. Of course a Shiite leadership that's friendly towards Iran isn't what the US wanted for Iraq, but, looking at the demographics, there's no way to prevent it. The WH should start to acwept reality. There's no way Sunnis will gain more influence in today's Iraq. They should start eating crow now. I see that we’re not that far apart, CS. Even though it’s useless to complain about spilled milk now, there are lessons to be learned for the failures and mistakes of the past. The main question is: Is there still time and opportunity to fix the mess? Imho, NO, but your mileage may vary.

“On points #6 and #7, of course I understand that the issue is Shiite majority, but the point is that there are better ways of insuring minority rights.”

Well, the right idea to give Sunnis more political power would have been consequently implementing a federal structure for Iraq. This would have promoted democracy on a more regional level, and insured that Sunni regions aren’t micromanged by a Shiite governemnt in Bagdad. But this train is long gone now, Iraq’s constitution is as it is, describing a more centrally governed nation. I don’t see how the clock can be turned back. Shiites obviously won’t root for this idea now. What reason would they have to give away power to the hated Sunnis?

So, this is a major obstacle towards pacifying Sunnis by giving them a higher level of participation in power. The US insistence on enhancing the political clout of the 20% minority of Sunnis not only contradicts the public pledge for spreading democracy, it’s standing in the way of a stable government, which would naturally consist only of Shiites. I guess it’s the misguided approach of a government of national unity that makes Maliki powerless and a suspicious figure on both sides. Of course a Shiite leadership that’s friendly towards Iran isn’t what the US wanted for Iraq, but, looking at the demographics, there’s no way to prevent it. The WH should start to acwept reality. There’s no way Sunnis will gain more influence in today’s Iraq. They should start eating crow now.

]]> By: CStanley http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42542 CStanley Thu, 11 Jan 2007 13:19:28 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42542 Also, the broader point I was making in my first response is that I disagree with Jack's premise that there's nothing new here. That's why I listed all of these things, but my complaint is that these shouldn't be new: we should have been doing most of this all along. Also, the broader point I was making in my first response is that I disagree with Jack’s premise that there’s nothing new here. That’s why I listed all of these things, but my complaint is that these shouldn’t be new: we should have been doing most of this all along.

]]> By: CStanley http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42541 CStanley Thu, 11 Jan 2007 13:18:15 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42541 Gray, Yeah, you make some good points and it's not as though I don't see those things. What I'm saying is that in order for the US to have kept its troops in harm's way for the benefit of the Iraqis (albeit also for US interests and also due to our moral obligation to help them rebuild since we initiated this), there should always have been stronger requirements from the Iraqi govt. On point #5, I agree that this was an error in judgement on Bush's part. I always understood his logic (and mostly agreed) with TIMED withdrawal plans. I think that if you say we're coming home in six months, that the nature of an insurgency is that the insurgents crawl under rocks for that length of time and then crawl back out after we leave. But conditional support for the Maliki govt is a different thing altogether. This means, for example, we put Malilki on notice that if he promises 6 Iraqi brigades and only 2 show up, we start bringing our guys home. If he tells our guys they can't take out members of the Mahdi army, then it's "Bye-bye." I think that Bush missed the distinction between these two concepts. Requiring Maliki to demonstrate political will to support our goals is different than saying that our support was conditional on actually achieving a goal (though I think there's some room for those types of benchmarks too: set a reasonable timeframe for Maliki to acheive this or that political goal- perhaps not making this public knowledge but telling him this behind closed doors.) On points #6 and #7, of course I understand that the issue is Shiite majority, but the point is that there are better ways of insuring minority rights. Gray,
Yeah, you make some good points and it’s not as though I don’t see those things. What I’m saying is that in order for the US to have kept its troops in harm’s way for the benefit of the Iraqis (albeit also for US interests and also due to our moral obligation to help them rebuild since we initiated this), there should always have been stronger requirements from the Iraqi govt.

On point #5, I agree that this was an error in judgement on Bush’s part. I always understood his logic (and mostly agreed) with TIMED withdrawal plans. I think that if you say we’re coming home in six months, that the nature of an insurgency is that the insurgents crawl under rocks for that length of time and then crawl back out after we leave. But conditional support for the Maliki govt is a different thing altogether. This means, for example, we put Malilki on notice that if he promises 6 Iraqi brigades and only 2 show up, we start bringing our guys home. If he tells our guys they can’t take out members of the Mahdi army, then it’s “Bye-bye.” I think that Bush missed the distinction between these two concepts. Requiring Maliki to demonstrate political will to support our goals is different than saying that our support was conditional on actually achieving a goal (though I think there’s some room for those types of benchmarks too: set a reasonable timeframe for Maliki to acheive this or that political goal- perhaps not making this public knowledge but telling him this behind closed doors.)

On points #6 and #7, of course I understand that the issue is Shiite majority, but the point is that there are better ways of insuring minority rights.

]]> By: Gray http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42537 Gray Thu, 11 Jan 2007 12:59:09 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42537 1. Several possible answers: Al Sadr is the strongman behind Maliki, Shia is the majority of voters. The US had to accept the insistence of the democratically elected government to stay out of Sadr city. Also, reports say Shiite militias keep up security where the US and Iraq forces can't or won't. Also, the US simply hasn't the troop strength to effectively pacify all those areas. 2. This is TOO risky. And there's no international support for this (with theexception of, maybe, Israel). 3. Indeed a shortage of troops. After the uS pacified a single city or suburb, they always had to shift their troops because the insurgency had simply moved to another place. 4. It WAS part of the Department of State's plan, which you should know, if you followed the reporting in the press. The DoD overruled this because of security concerns. 5. Ask Bush. Until now, he always denied any propsoals for Benchmarking with the argument that this would give the insurgents a hint how to pressurize the government. 6. Why don't libertarians have more political power? Or the greens? It's the elections, stupid! 7. Yes, why wasn't it? Maybe because Shiite rule now and they don't want to share 'their' oil with Sunnis? 8. Got me. I really don't know. 1. Several possible answers: Al Sadr is the strongman behind Maliki, Shia is the majority of voters. The US had to accept the insistence of the democratically elected government to stay out of Sadr city. Also, reports say Shiite militias keep up security where the US and Iraq forces can’t or won’t. Also, the US simply hasn’t the troop strength to effectively pacify all those areas.

2. This is TOO risky. And there’s no international support for this (with theexception of, maybe, Israel).

3. Indeed a shortage of troops. After the uS pacified a single city or suburb, they always had to shift their troops because the insurgency had simply moved to another place.

4. It WAS part of the Department of State’s plan, which you should know, if you followed the reporting in the press. The DoD overruled this because of security concerns.

5. Ask Bush. Until now, he always denied any propsoals for Benchmarking with the argument that this would give the insurgents a hint how to pressurize the government.

6. Why don’t libertarians have more political power? Or the greens? It’s the elections, stupid!

7. Yes, why wasn’t it? Maybe because Shiite rule now and they don’t want to share ‘their’ oil with Sunnis?

8. Got me. I really don’t know.

]]> By: CStanley http://themoderatevoice.com/10206/the-fundamental-question/comment-page-1/#comment-42526 CStanley Thu, 11 Jan 2007 11:46:56 +0000 http://themoderatevoice.com/2007/01/10/war/the-fundamental-question/#comment-42526 OK, I'll take the bait (and I'll prepare for massive critique of my comment). Differences: 1. Change of the rules of engagement for our troops, particularly that we will be permitted in all neighborhoods to root out militants, including Sadr City. Question is, why did we agree to a situation where this wasn't the case before? 2. Taking a harder line with Iran and Syria for trafficking in weapons and combatants. Unlike some, I don't see a problem with this: if other nations are supplying our enemies and backing them, they are engaging in an act of war against us. It's risky, yes, because I certainly don't want to see it blow up into a regional war, but I don't see how we could possibly ignore the reality. And I guess I'm inclined to think that the naval threat to Iran is probably the best-or the least bad-or possibly the only- way to give ourselves leverage against Iran's covert involvement. 3. Focus on holding neighborhoods after initial sweeps. Again, why wasn't this part of the previous strategy? (the answer to that one may be shortage of troops, and if so, then of course this may be the fatal flaw in the plan.) 4. Focus on reconstruction. Cue the chorus: why wasn't this part of the previous strategy? (this one is closely related to item 3, of course: if we can't hold territory we can't reconstruct it.) 5. Firm benchmarks for political progress and holding Maliki responsible. Why wasn't this part of the previous strategy? 6. Insistance on greater political power for Sunnis (while acknowledging the need for de-Baathification). Again...why wasn't this... 7. Insistance on resolution of the issue of oil revenue sharing. Why wasn't this... 8. Insistance on Iraqi commitment to reconstruction. Why wasn't this... Personally I think what may prove to be the greatest tragedy is that this exact strategy might have had a decent chance of success if it had been employed one year ago. At that point, I saw in the election of Maliki an opportunity to get things under control during 2006. Then of course Samarra happened and any semblence of progress quickly began to unravel. But that was Maliki's first moment of truth (and I could identify several other points afterward where he could/should have risen to the occasion). Now that we're finally saying that our commitment to Maliki's government is conditional to his showing the commitment to a unified Iraq that respects minority rights, sadly it may be too late. OK, I’ll take the bait (and I’ll prepare for massive critique of my comment).

Differences:
1. Change of the rules of engagement for our troops, particularly that we will be permitted in all neighborhoods to root out militants, including Sadr City. Question is, why did we agree to a situation where this wasn’t the case before?

2. Taking a harder line with Iran and Syria for trafficking in weapons and combatants. Unlike some, I don’t see a problem with this: if other nations are supplying our enemies and backing them, they are engaging in an act of war against us. It’s risky, yes, because I certainly don’t want to see it blow up into a regional war, but I don’t see how we could possibly ignore the reality. And I guess I’m inclined to think that the naval threat to Iran is probably the best-or the least bad-or possibly the only- way to give ourselves leverage against Iran’s covert involvement.

3. Focus on holding neighborhoods after initial sweeps. Again, why wasn’t this part of the previous strategy? (the answer to that one may be shortage of troops, and if so, then of course this may be the fatal flaw in the plan.)

4. Focus on reconstruction. Cue the chorus: why wasn’t this part of the previous strategy? (this one is closely related to item 3, of course: if we can’t hold territory we can’t reconstruct it.)

5. Firm benchmarks for political progress and holding Maliki responsible. Why wasn’t this part of the previous strategy?

6. Insistance on greater political power for Sunnis (while acknowledging the need for de-Baathification). Again…why wasn’t this…

7. Insistance on resolution of the issue of oil revenue sharing. Why wasn’t this…

8. Insistance on Iraqi commitment to reconstruction. Why wasn’t this…

Personally I think what may prove to be the greatest tragedy is that this exact strategy might have had a decent chance of success if it had been employed one year ago. At that point, I saw in the election of Maliki an opportunity to get things under control during 2006. Then of course Samarra happened and any semblence of progress quickly began to unravel. But that was Maliki’s first moment of truth (and I could identify several other points afterward where he could/should have risen to the occasion). Now that we’re finally saying that our commitment to Maliki’s government is conditional to his showing the commitment to a unified Iraq that respects minority rights, sadly it may be too late.

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