Egyptian Army Tanks: Military Mentality When Communication is Weak and Close Leadership Absent: Peril Becomes Far More Present
The first breakdown for any army is communication.
As I understand it, many of Egypt’s army forces were in cell phone and internet connection with headquarters and one another. How orders are now dissemanated at the same time and to all units is no longer tidy and dependable.
This can cause disorder amongst units and their commanders, as each group does only what it sees fit at the moment and in the locale they are occupying, rather than a much larger picture seen and analyzed by central control headquarters.
Cell phones and internet transmissions that have been blocked, also block the military from flash sending pictures of various situations as they come upon them.
It is a known fact in military manuevers, as in much smaller, say scrimmages in football, that there is likely no win, if there is no plan… and
that if there is no central plan on part of overall military, that rogue and anarchical actions take place… such as purposely running large carriers into civilians, such as shooting people on sight for whatever undisciplined and unsanctioned reason.
There’s a saying in the military that applies to Mubarak and his shutting down so much of the timely communication for his Army: A squadron without a commander is far less safe than one with a commander with all communications intact.
Mubarak by attempting to confuse and block the people’s literal electronic and digital communication, has set in place ‘royally’ the scene for his Army to act ‘at will’ toward those in the streets and in villages and at schools and universities. Acting ‘at will’ ‘in the field’ means harming, injuring and shooting any one wishes.
It will not stand that Mubarak preens to the people tonight like Nero showing off his many fiddles from the dais, and pretending he has nothing to do with, not ordering– oh no, that would be too transparent– but rather allowing this violence by his own Army.
As in a Turkish (and equivalent Arabian and Chinese) fairtytale, a general is begging the Kahn to allow the general to create a wholesale slaughter of the enemies of the Khan. But, the Kahn does not want blood on his hands, so he says to his general, cunningly playing on the man’s pride: “What can I do to prevent such a powerful man as you from acting on his sense of virility.”
Let us hope, Mubarak has not, in essence, said the same to his very real army with very real ammunition and tanks.